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THE ARBITERS OF DECENCY: A STUDY OF 
LEGISLATORS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT ROLE 
David Niven & Aliza Plener Cover* 
Abstract: Within Eighth Amendment doctrine, legislators are arbiters of contemporary 
values. The United States Supreme Court looks closely to state and federal death penalty 
legislation to determine whether a given punishment is out of keeping with “evolving standards 
of decency.” Those who draft, debate, and vote on death penalty laws thus participate in both 
ordinary and higher lawmaking. This Article investigates this dual role. 
We coded and aggregated information about every floor statement made in the legislative 
debates preceding the recent passage of bills abolishing the death penalty in Connecticut, 
Illinois, and Nebraska. We categorized all statements according to their position on the death 
penalty, their subject matter, and any references they made to the courts and Constitution. We 
also collected basic facts about the legislators, including about political party, race, education, 
and profession. We present our quantitative and qualitative findings here. 
Building upon these findings, we critically examine the Court’s use of legislation as an 
“objective indicator” of “evolving standards of decency.” We identify disconnects between 
legislative outcomes and community “standards of decency,” and we analyze legislators’ 
understanding of their constitutional significance and why their level of self-awareness may 
matter. Finally, we consider how legislative debates—rather than outcomes alone—might 
provide insights into contemporary values. In particular, the strong concern we observed over 
wrongful execution may support more robust Eighth Amendment protections for those 
claiming actual innocence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An enduring debate among jurists and legal academics concerns the 
proper role of legislative history in the interpretation of statutory text.1 
This Article considers how legislative history might be used in another 
context in which judges analyze legislative action: the Eighth Amendment 
inquiry into “evolving standards of decency.” In this context, legislation 
matters not for its own sake but as a symbol of something greater: 
society’s contemporary moral standards. 
In its modern death penalty jurisprudence, the United States Supreme 
Court looks to society’s “evolving standards of decency” in deciding 
whether a particular punishment practice violates the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment.”2 To discern these 
“evolving standards” in the death penalty context, the Court refers to two 
primary “objective indicators”: state legislation and capital sentencing 
data.3 In doing so, the Court acknowledges in uniquely explicit terms the 
interaction between its constitutional pronouncements and popular will. 
Majoritarian decision-making by legislatures and juries impacts the 
trajectory of Eighth Amendment law. 
                                                     
1. Compare, e.g., Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782–83 (2018) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (defending the Court’s reliance on legislative history), with id. at 783–84 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (critiquing that same reliance). See 
also, e.g., Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (critiquing the resort to legislative history); 
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 
847 (1992) (defending the use of legislative history). 
2. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–13 (2002). 
3. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“The clearest and most reliable objective evidence 
of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures. We have also looked 
to data concerning the actions of sentencing juries.” (citing cases)), abrogated on other grounds by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (citing 
cases), modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008).  
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A substantial body of legal scholarship is devoted to the Court’s 
“evolving standards of decency” analysis—–to whether the Supreme 
Court is accurately deciphering society’s “standards of decency” and to 
whether it should be engaging in that inquiry in the first place.4 Scholars 
frequently criticize the doctrine for being too majoritarian—for failing to 
place a sufficient counter-majoritarian check upon harsh punishments 
imposed through political processes.5 And some scholarship has 
specifically critiqued the use of legislation as the primary indicator of 
society’s evolving standards of decency.6 According to these critiques, 
legislative outcomes are imprecise barometers of morality: they bear 
useful simplicity as a judicial shorthand, but that simplicity can also 
obscure important details and may in some cases be used to produce 
deceptive signals of society’s values.7 
This Article advances these scholarly discussions by peering behind 
death penalty legislation to the debates that preceded them. We conducted 
a study analyzing the floor debates leading to three recent legislative 
actions abolishing the death penalty: from Connecticut in 2009 and 2012, 
from Illinois in 2011, and from Nebraska in 2015.8 We coded and then 
aggregated information about every floor statement made in these debates, 
including about the types of justifications made for and against the death 
penalty, and about all references made to the United States Supreme Court 
and to constitutional law. 
                                                     
4. For a sampling of such scholarship, see for example Ian P. Farrell, Strict Scrutiny Under the 
Eighth Amendment, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 853, 854 (2013) [hereinafter Farrell, Strict Scrutiny]; Tonja 
Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation As Evidence of 
an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2006); Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding 
Death, 57 DUKE L.J. 1 (2007); Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: 
“Still in Search of A Unifying Principle”?, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (2011); Mary Sigler, The Political 
Morality of the Eighth Amendment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 403 (2011); Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. 
Sarma & Sophie Cull, The Way the Court Gauges Consensus (and How to Do It Better), 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2397 (2014); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1749–57 (2008).  
5. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 69 (1980) (“[I]t makes no sense to 
employ the value judgments of the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value 
judgments of the majority.”); Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1098 (“[I]t is axiomatic that the Constitution is 
meant to protect citizens from the whim of political majorities; as such there is a fundamental 
theoretical problem with interpreting a constitutional provision on the basis of whether there is a 
national consensus for or against it.”); Lain, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 and accompanying text (citing 
scholarship); Raeker-Jordan, supra note 4, at 137 (critiquing the Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976), plurality for “improperly put[ting] its thumb on the scale toward majoritarian control of the 
Eighth Amendment and away from protection of individual rights”). 
6. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1091–93; Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421. 
7. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1092–93; Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2420–23. 
8. In 2013, Maryland also repealed the death penalty. However, we did not include Maryland in 
this Article because legislative transcripts were not available for us to review. 
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In this Article, we report qualitative and quantitative findings from our 
study and use these findings to investigate three interrelated questions. 
First, scholars have argued that legislation does not reliably encapsulate 
public morality on the death penalty. What can legislative history teach us 
about the viability of legislative outcomes as “objective indicators” of 
“evolving standards of decency”? 
Second, many have voiced concerns that the “evolving standards of 
decency” doctrine cedes too much control over individual rights to the 
whims of majoritarian legislators. But little attention has focused on how 
legislators understand the constitutional dimensions of their lawmaking 
in the death penalty context. What insights can legislative debates provide 
into the institutional dynamics between courts and majoritarian 
legislatures in the Eighth Amendment context? 
Third, some have criticized the reliance on legislative outcomes and 
jury verdicts, rather than other available data points, as the “objective 
indicators” of contemporary values. If we understood legislative debates 
themselves to contain clues into “evolving standards of decency,” what 
lessons about societal standards might we discern? 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I summarizes the Court’s 
“evolving standards of decency” doctrine, the relevance of state 
legislation to the Court’s constitutional analysis, and some prominent 
critiques of the doctrine. Part II explains the methodology of our study. 
Part III presents our major findings, including information we aggregated 
about the overall character of the debates and anecdotal information we 
collected about particularly illuminating statements. 
Part IV connects the results of our study to Eighth Amendment 
doctrine. We find support for the critique that state legislation is an 
imperfect indicator of society’s “evolving standards of decency.” 
Moreover, we find that the legislators in our study demonstrated little 
understanding of their constitutional significance—and, indeed, of 
judicial processes and constitutional law more generally—an ignorance 
that may have both negative and positive consequences for Eighth 
Amendment doctrine as a whole. Finally, we observe a strong moral 
concern throughout the debates over executing the innocent and consider 
how that concern might be incorporated into Eighth Amendment doctrine. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A central pillar of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is its 
assessment of society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Chief Justice 
Warren first introduced that phrase in his plurality opinion in Trop v. 
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Dulles,9 writing that the “scope” of the Eighth Amendment is not “static”; 
rather, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”10 The 
Court later clarified that society’s “evolving standards of decency” should 
be gauged in reference to “objective indicators”11 rather than defined 
according to the Court’s own subjective impressions. To date, the Court 
has specifically endorsed two principal sources for “objective evidence of 
contemporary values” in its “evolving standards of decency” analysis: 
“the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures” and “data 
concerning the actions of sentencing juries.”12 
Although emphasizing “evolving standards of decency,” the Court has 
never deferred wholly to contemporary practice, but has insisted that, in 
the end, its own judgment of a punishment’s constitutionality is 
controlling.13 Nevertheless, the inquiry into “objective indicators” of 
“evolving standards of decency” has been an essential component of the 
Court’s analysis. Indeed, the Court has never parted ways from the 
“standards of decency” it has discerned14—at least not in any death 
penalty case.15 And the Court has frequently relied heavily on its reading 
                                                     
9. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
10. Id. at 101. 
11. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277–79 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“Proportionality review under those evolving standards should 
be informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent . . . .’”) (citation omitted)). 
12. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002).  
13. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008) (“Consensus is not dispositive. Whether the 
death penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards 
elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose.” (citing cases)), modified, 554 U.S. 945 
(2008); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (“[I]n cases involving a [national] consensus, [the Court’s] own 
judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ . . . by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment 
reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion))); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“As we have seen, however, the Eighth Amendment demands more than that a challenged 
punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with 
the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment.”). 
14. As we will discuss shortly, some scholars and jurists have read from this consistency that the 
Court is able to manipulate the “objective indicators” to such that they “indicate” whatever it is that 
the Court wishes to conclude. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.  
15. In at least one non-capital case, the Court’s decision did arguably depart from the “objective 
indicia” of “evolving standards of decency.” In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), a case which 
struck down as unconstitutional a mandatory punishment of life imprisonment without parole for a 
juvenile homicide offender, the Court deemed the “objective indicia” inquiry unnecessary altogether 
because its holding was dictated by prior precedent. Id. at 483 (“[O]ur decision flows 
straightforwardly from our precedents: specifically, the principle of Roper, Graham, and our 
individualized sentencing cases that youth matters for purposes of meting out the law’s most serious 
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of evolving standards to justify the outcome it reaches. In Gregg v. 
Georgia,16 the Court reinstated the death penalty17 four years after striking 
it down as unconstitutionally administered in Furman v. Georgia.18 The 
justices were moved by strong empirical evidence in the wake of Furman 
that the nation’s “standards of decency” had not evolved beyond the death 
penalty.19 The Court weighed heavily the post-Furman re-enactment of 
death penalty statutes by thirty-five state legislatures and by Congress, as 
well as the sentencing of 460 individuals to death by March of 1976.20 
After Gregg, the “evolving standards of decency” analysis retained 
prominence, and contemporary standards have been invoked numerous 
times since then to justify Eighth Amendment opinions.21 Most 
interestingly, in Atkins v. Virginia22 and Roper v. Simmons,23 changing 
“objective indicators” appeared to directly alter the previously settled 
scope of the Eighth Amendment’s protection. In Atkins, the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of intellectually 
disabled24 offenders,25 without confessing that it had erred thirteen years 
                                                     
punishments. When both of those circumstances have obtained in the past, we have not scrutinized or 
relied in the same way on legislative enactments.”); id. at 484 n.11. Justice Alito in dissent sharply 
criticized the shift: “What today’s decision shows is that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer 
tied to any objective indicia of society’s standards. Our Eighth Amendment case law is now entirely 
inward looking.” Id. at 514 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
Professor Ian Farrell has asserted that the sidestepping of the “objective indicia” analysis in Miller 
is a harbinger of things to come and that “the Court is likely to follow Miller in declining to employ 
Objective Indicia Analysis, and that ultimately, the methodology will be abandoned entirely.” Farrell, 
Strict Scrutiny, supra note 4, at 903–04. 
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
17. Id. at 179–82 (plurality opinion). 
18. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
19. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–82 (plurality opinion). 
20. Id. Note that Furman struck down the death penalty as administered, but a majority of the Court 
did not hold the death penalty per se unconstitutional. Id. at 168–69 (explaining the precedential effect 
of Furman). Thus, thirty-five states rewrote their death penalty statutes after Furman in an attempt to 
conform their laws to that decision’s constitutional requirements. Id. at 179–80. 
21. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–96 (1982) (conducting an “objective indicia” 
analysis in holding unconstitutional the death penalty for offenders who neither killed nor intended to 
kill); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–97 (1977) (plurality opinion) (conducting an “objective 
indicia” analysis in holding unconstitutional the death penalty for the rape of an adult). 
22. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
23. 543 U.S. 551 (2004). 
24. The Court used the term “mental retardation” in Atkins but has since recognized that the 
preferred (and synonymous) term is “intellectual disability.” Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 
1986, 1990 (2014). 
25. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 32. 
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earlier when it upheld as constitutional the very same practice.26 Instead, 
the Court explained that since Penry v. Lynaugh,27 “[t]he practice . . . has 
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has 
developed against it.”28 In other words, a formerly constitutional practice 
was now unconstitutional because the “objective indicators” of society’s 
“evolving standards of decency” had changed. Similarly, when the Court 
barred the execution of juveniles in Roper,29 it departed from the opposite 
conclusion it had reached in Stanford v. Kentucky30 by reanalyzing the 
“objective indicia” of “evolving standards of decency” and deeming them 
sufficiently changed.31 
As mentioned earlier, when evaluating society’s “standards of 
decency,” the Court has focused on objective information “as expressed 
in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions.”32 
Other evidence of society’s contemporary morality, including 
international and foreign law,33 viewpoints of professional 
organizations,34 and public opinion polls,35 have appeared in some of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment cases and arguably influenced the 
Court’s analysis, but they have been discussed only tentatively and 
without any binding reliance or endorsement.36 The Court has never 
                                                     
26. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by, Atkins, 536 
U.S. 304. 
27. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by, Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
28. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
29. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2004). 
30. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
31. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67. See also Stinneford, supra note 4, at 1741 (“In Atkins v. Virginia 
and Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court appeared to agree that the imposition of the death penalty 
on the mentally retarded and on seventeen-year-olds respectively was not cruel and unusual 
punishment in 1989, when Penry v. Lynaugh and Stanford v. Kentucky were decided. Nonetheless, 
the Court held that such punishments are cruel and unusual today. As Justice Scalia stated in his 
Roper dissent, the decisions in Atkins and Roper are based on the proposition ‘that the meaning of our 
Constitution has changed over the past 15 years—not, mind you, that this Court’s decision 15 years 
ago was wrong, but that the Constitution has changed.’” (citations omitted)). 
32. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563), modified 554 U.S. 
945 (2008). 
33. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Stinneford, supra note 4, at 1751–52 (citing Roper, 543 
U.S. at 575–78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21).  
34. See Hall v. Florida, 574 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993–97 (2014). 
35. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) (“The public sentiment expressed in these and 
other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective 
indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely.”), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 n.25 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing 
public opinion polls). 
36. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In my view, these two 
sources—the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations—ought to be the sole 
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provided a precise formula for assessing the constitutional significance of 
legislation and sentencing data. With respect to legislation, the Court has 
considered both the absolute number of states that permit or reject a 
particular practice and the direction and consistency of the legislative 
trend.37 Although the Court does sometimes seek to decipher the impetus 
behind a particular piece of legislation38 and has noted whether the 
legislation passed by a large or narrow margin,39 the Court rarely looks to 
legislative history to answer questions about the significance of the 
legislation or to deepen its understanding of social norms. One exception 
of note was Kennedy v. Louisiana,40 when the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional the death penalty for child rape.41 The majority and 
dissent disputed whether the Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia,42 
which prohibited the death penalty for the rape of an adult,43 had deterred 
state legislators from enacting legislation to punish the rape of a child.44 
                                                     
indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes 
of the Eighth Amendment. They are the only objective indicia of contemporary values firmly 
supported by our precedents. More importantly, however, they can be reconciled with the undeniable 
precepts that the democratic branches of government and individual sentencing juries are, by design, 
better suited than courts to evaluating and giving effect to the complex societal and moral 
considerations that inform the selection of publicly acceptable criminal punishments.”). 
37. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 (“Though our review of national consensus is not confined 
to tallying the number of States with applicable death penalty legislation, it is of significance that, in 
45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 
(“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction 
of change.”); Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2406–11 (providing a helpful summary and explanation of 
the Court’s use of state legislative data in its consensus analysis). 
38. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 (“Responding to the national attention received by the Bowden 
execution and our decision in Penry, state legislatures across the country began to address the issue.”); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298–99 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The fact that some 
States have adopted mandatory measures following Furman while others have legislated standards to 
guide jury discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court’s multi-opinioned decision 
in that case.”). 
39. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (“The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the 
legislatures that have addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”). 
40. 554 U.S. 407, modified, 554 U.S. 945 (2008). 
41. Id. at 413. 
42. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
43. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion). 
44. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 429 (“Still, respondent contends, it is possible that state legislatures have 
understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers the situation of the minor victim as well. We see 
little evidence of this. Respondent cites no reliable data to indicate that state legislatures have read 
Coker to bar capital punishment for child rape and, for this reason, have been deterred from passing 
applicable death penalty legislation. In the absence of evidence from those States where legislation 
has been proposed but not enacted we refuse to speculate about the motivations and concerns of 
particular state legislators.”); id. at 448 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In assessing current norms, the Court 
relies primarily on the fact that only 6 of the 50 States now have statutes that permit the death penalty 
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The “evolving standards of decency” doctrine, with its outward-facing 
and dynamic stance, can be both admired and maligned. To its credit, the 
doctrine has made the Eighth Amendment a tool for progressive 
protections in modern times, rather than a stagnant barrier against 
eighteenth century notions of barbarity.45 And through its reliance on 
“objective indicators” of contemporary values, the Court arguably has 
been able to bolster the legitimacy of some its more controversial 
decisions against charges of judicial overreaching, moral subjectivity, and 
arbitrariness. 
Yet the doctrine has also received substantial criticism from judges and 
legal academics, including some who would seem to agree with the 
outcome reached in several of the Court’s major cases employing it. 
Commentators have advanced two primary big-picture critiques of the 
Court’s reliance on “evolving standards of decency” test. 
The first critique is that the test is too majoritarian.46 Critics argue that 
by looking to majoritarian legislatures in defining the contours of an 
individual right, the Court abdicates its counter-majoritarian role and fails 
to meaningfully constrain cruel yet commonly accepted punishments.47 
Moreover, from a states’ rights perspective, a majoritarian Eighth 
Amendment undermines the states’ traditional freedom to serve as 
laboratories of experimentation and upsets the federalism balance by 
imposing some states’ views upon sister states that disagree with them.48 
The other primary critique of the Court’s “evolving standards of 
decency” jurisprudence is that it is merely a charade that provides cover 
for the Court to reach its own desired outcome.49 According to this 
                                                     
for this offense. But this statistic is a highly unreliable indicator of the views of state lawmakers and 
their constituents . . . . [D]icta in this Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia has stunted legislative 
consideration of the question whether the death penalty for the targeted offense of raping a young 
child is consistent with prevailing standards of decency. The Coker dicta gave state legislators and 
others good reason to fear that any law permitting the imposition of the death penalty for this crime 
would meet precisely the fate that has now befallen the Louisiana statute that is currently before us, 
and this threat strongly discouraged state legislators—regardless of their own values and those of their 
constituents—from supporting the enactment of such legislation.”); see also id. at 452–54 (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (explaining how misinterpretation of Coker may have influenced state legislatures’ choice 
not to enact the death penalty for child rape). 
45. As Justice Stevens put it, “[a] claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards 
that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of 
Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.” Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.  
46. See supra note 5 (collecting scholarship). 
47. See supra note 5. 
48. Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1105–23. 
49. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2749 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 
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critique, the problem of “evolving standards of decency” doctrine is that 
it creates the veneer, rather than the reality, of a majoritarian constraint.50 
The Eighth Amendment inquiry is not too majoritarian; it is, rather, too 
susceptible to the personal predilections of nine men and women in black 
robes. “Evolving standards of decency” are inherently malleable. Some 
attribute this malleability to ends-oriented machinations by members of 
the Court51; others to the inherent ambiguity of the supposed “objective 
indicators,”52 as legislative action and jury verdicts are fuzzy signals 
subject to competing interpretations. Critics have also argued that the 
Court’s professed reliance on these “objective indicators” creates 
doctrinal instability53: the Court is simply making up Eighth Amendment 
doctrine as it goes and interpreting the “indicators” in inconsistent ways 
so as to match the conclusions it wishes to reach.54 To these critics, it is 
no coincidence that when the Court goes on to exercise its “own 
judgment,”55 its judgment always coincides with the results identified 
from the objective indicators.56 
Beyond these two primary conceptual critiques, other scholars have 
critiqued the Court’s current means of evaluating “evolving standards of 
decency,” even if we were to accept that ultimate goal. Most significantly 
for the purposes of this Article, scholars have questioned the wisdom of 
relying on state legislation as an “objective indicator” of contemporary 
values.57 
                                                     
YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 312–13 (2013); Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1094; Lain, supra note 4, at 83 (citing 
scholarship making this critique). 
50. See Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1094. 
51. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Sigler, supra note 4, at 410–11. 
53. Jacobi, supra note 4, at 1150. 
54. Corinna Barrett Lain argues with nuance for a third alternative: that the “evolving standards of 
decency” inquiry is both majoritarian as a doctrine and a charade, but that the Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence is nonetheless tethered to majoritarian preferences through non-doctrinal means. The 
real majoritarian influence on the Court comes from extrajudicial majoritarian forces that pervade its 
decision-making not only in the death penalty and Eighth Amendment contexts, but throughout its 
constitutional jurisprudence. Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7. 
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313; id. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56. But see supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s decision not to engage in 
the evolving standards of decency analysis in Miller, when consensus evidence was weak); Farrell, 
Abandoning Objective Indicia, supra note 49, at 304 (“The real significance of Miller lies less in the 
result and more in the method employed—or, more precisely, the method not employed . . . . Justice 
Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, declined to apply objective indicia analysis.”). 
57. There are also substantial critiques of the manner in which the Court relies on jury verdicts as 
evidence of “evolving standards of decency.” See, e.g., Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s 
Lost Jurors: Death Qualification and Evolving Standards of Decency, 92 IND. L.J. 113 (2016) 
(arguing that the Court’s failure to consider the effects of death qualification on capital jury verdicts 
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First, some have asserted that state legislation on the death penalty does 
not accurately represent community sentiment on that issue and thus is 
misleading as an “objective indicator” of “evolving standards of 
decency.”58 There are a number of reasons for a potential disconnect. 
Elections are not single-issue referenda on the death penalty, and 
representatives elected for their stance on, say, fiscal policy or the 
economy may well depart from the constituents who voted for them on 
the question of the death penalty.59 Moreover, breakdowns in the 
democratic bona fides of our electoral system—such as partisan 
gerrymandering—undermine the representativeness of legislatures and 
create a gap between the people and their lawmakers.60 Additionally, due 
to political pressures that lead toward the proliferation of harsh criminal 
laws, criminal justice legislation in particular may not accurately reflect 
community sentiment on these same issues.61 Furthermore, legislators 
have been shown to be motivated by a multitude of forces beyond simple 
public opinion when deciding which bills to support,62 and even when 
they do take public opinion into account, they may miscalculate what that 
                                                     
skews its Eighth Amendment analysis). We do not focus on these critiques here, as our study relates 
to the legislative process. 
58. Edmund F. McGarrell & Marla Sandys, The Misperception of Public Opinion Toward Capital 
Punishment: Examining the Spuriousness Explanation of Death Penalty Support, 39 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 
500, 500–13 (1996). 
59. Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2422. 
60. See generally, e.g., LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME 
MAPS (2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20 
Maps%205.16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY7T-8WQH] (detailing distorting effect of gerrymandering 
upon congressional elections). 
61. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., Too Young for the Death Penalty: An Empirical Examination 
of Community Conscience and the Juvenile Death Penalty from the Perspective of Capital Jurors, 84 
B.U. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2004) (citing Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital 
Punishment: Problematizing the “Will of the People”, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 303, 332–33 
(1997)) (explaining how legislators may “whip up”—rather than act in response to—public support 
for harsh punishment); Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive 
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 890–91 (2004) (“There are good reasons 
to think that the legislative process may produce statutes that systematically exaggerate a crime’s 
seriousness. Legislators face powerful political pressures that lead them to ratchet up sentences. Even 
a legislator who thinks a particular sentence is unwarranted or believes that her constituents, on 
reflection, would view a sentence as unduly harsh (either categorically or with respect to some of the 
acts that fall within its scope) may fear being tarred as soft on crime if she votes against a crime bill.” 
(citations omitted)). 
62. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, supra note 49, at 313. 
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public opinion is.63 Legislation may also lag behind public opinion, with 
outdated and under-enforced laws remaining on the books.64 
Another concern with the use of state legislation as an indicator of 
community sentiment on the death penalty lies with the abstract and non-
individualized nature and quality of legislative decision-making. 
Legislation sets generalized policy that can be disconnected from the 
human consequences of individual cases: 
Unlike a jury which must see the accused in the flesh and listen 
to the details of his character and background, the information 
that filters into legislative debates over capital punishment is 
largely abstract considerations. Deciding to impose a death 
sentence after listening to the character and background of the 
defendant is something altogether different. The latter is a 
“reasoned moral response” based on more complete information 
about the crime and the person who committed it. Whether or not 
legislative judgments reflect the abstract policy preferences of the 
public, legislative enactments do not tell us about how the public 
feels about the punishment when it is applied to real, individual 
people. The legislative process is not generally geared towards 
the reality that those who commit crimes are people, too.65 
If we understand our society’s “standards of decency” about punishment 
to be the standards we adhere to when exposed to the facts and 
consequences of individual cases, legislative decision-making may be too 
theoretical to serve as an “objective indicator.”66 Similarly, Justice 
Marshall, in his concurring opinion in Furman and in his dissenting 
opinion in Gregg, asserted that the death penalty is unconstitutional in part 
because of his belief that “the American people, fully informed as to the 
purposes of the death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject 
it as morally unacceptable.”67 Marshall insisted upon a heightened (and 
hypothetical) standard of the people’s informed opinion, rather than their 
                                                     
63. McGarrell & Sandys, supra note 58, at 500–13; John T. Whitehead, Michael Blankenship & 
John Paul Wright, Elite Versus Citizen Attitudes on Capital Punishment: Incongruity Between the 
Public and Policymakers, 27 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 249–58 (1999). 
64. Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007) (“As is often the 
case with penal prohibitions, support for officially discarding death penalty statutes tended not to 
materialize until well after those statutes already had been discarded in practice.”). 
65. Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421 (footnotes omitted). 
66. The outcomes of popular referenda might be even less considered than legislative outcomes; 
thus, along this measure, we might be even more wary of ballot initiatives than legislation as 
“evolving standards of decency.”  
67. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
2018] ARBITERS OF DECENCY 1409 
 
abstract and uneducated impressions, to govern the constitutional 
analysis.68 
A third concern about using state legislation as the primary “objective 
indicator” of “evolving standards of decency” is the inherent difficulty in 
ascribing underlying causal motivations to the legislators who supported 
any particular piece of legislation. A legislator who votes in favor of a 
death penalty abolition bill, for example, may be motivated by moral 
objections to the death penalty, but she may instead be motivated by 
administrative, fiscal, or any number of other concerns.69 Deciphering 
which precise “standard of decency” any particular piece of legislation 
“indicates” is a fraught enterprise. This challenge is even greater when the 
Court seeks to interpret how abolitionist states have legislated with respect 
to more narrow issues within capital punishment, such as the availability 
of the death penalty to punish categories of offenders or types of 
offenses.70 
II. METHOD OF STUDY 
With an eye toward establishing the standards state legislators apply as 
they articulate their positions on the death penalty, we analyzed the 
entirety of floor debate on the issue from the Connecticut legislature in 
2009 and 2012, the Illinois legislature in 2011, and the Nebraska state 
Senate in 2015.71 These are the three states with the most recent legislative 
repeals of the death penalty for which complete transcripts of the floor 
debates were available.72 These states are distinct in political culture73 as 
well as in legislative structure, as Nebraska features the nation’s only 
                                                     
68. Id. (“[I]f the constitutionality of the death penalty turns, as I have urged, on the opinion of an 
informed citizenry, then even the enactment of new death statutes cannot be viewed as conclusive. In 
Furman, I observed that the American people are largely unaware of the information critical to a 
judgment on the morality of the death penalty, and concluded that if they were better informed they 
would consider it shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. A recent study, conducted after the enactment 
of the post-Furman statutes, has confirmed that the American people know little about the death 
penalty, and that the opinions of an informed public would differ significantly from those of a public 
unaware of the consequences and effects of the death penalty.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
69. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20–21 (2009). 
70. Sigler, supra note 4, at 410–11. 
71. We focused on legislative debate rather than testimony given by witnesses at legislative 
hearings for two primary reasons. First, and from a practical perspective, transcripts of the legislative 
debates were more readily available. Second, and more importantly, our focus was on understanding 
the legislators themselves, and the arguments they chose to bring to the legislative floor, as it is the 
legislators who ultimately determine the direction of state law. 
72. Maryland repealed the death penalty in 2013, but we were unable to obtain transcripts of the 
debates preceding the repeal. MD. CODE ANN., Death Penalty § 71–79 (West 2018) (repealed 2013). 
73. DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 9, 18 (1966). 
13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
1410 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 93:1397 
 
unicameral legislature while Connecticut and Illinois have a traditional 
bicameral House of Representatives and Senate. 
A. An Overview of Legislative Action 
In Connecticut, a serious legislative effort to repeal the death penalty 
was launched in 2005. In 2007, two men perpetrated a horrific home 
invasion, sexually assaulting and murdering a mother and her two 
daughters in Cheshire, Connecticut. The case drew national and 
international media attention and was, not surprisingly, a frequently 
discussed topic when the repeal effort was renewed in 2009.74 While the 
State House of Representatives (90-56) and State Senate (19-17) did vote 
to repeal the death penalty, Connecticut Governor Jodi Rell (Republican) 
vetoed the repeal, and the Senate lacked the votes to override the veto.75 
In 2012, a repeal bill was again heard in the legislature and again passed 
both the House (86-62) and Senate (20-16). Connecticut Governor Daniel 
Malloy (Democrat) signed the bill into law.76 The Cheshire case was again 
a significant factor in the legislative debate, with some legislators moved 
to oppose the bill based on the depravity of the crime, and others satisfied 
by a provision in the repeal bill that maintained the death sentences for 
the two men convicted in the Cheshire case and for nine others on death 
row. That provision was later overturned by the Connecticut Supreme 
Court, resulting in life without parole sentences for the eleven men who 
had been on death row.77 At the time of the 2012 repeal, a Quinnipiac 
University poll found 62% of Connecticut voters opposed abolishing the 
death penalty.78 
In Nebraska, the state Senate passed a bill to repeal the death penalty 
in 1979.79 The bill was vetoed by Governor Charley Thone 
                                                     
74. See, e.g., RYAN D’AGOSTINO, THE RISING: MURDER, HEARTBREAK, AND THE POWER OF 
HUMAN RESILIENCE IN AN AMERICAN TOWN 190 (2015) (documenting the media swarm that 
descended on the town and the victims’ family). 
75. Chris Keating, Rell Vetoes Bill to Abolish Death Penalty, HARTFORD COURANT (Jun. 6, 2009), 
http://articles.courant.com/2009-06-06/news/death-penalty-veto-0605.art_1_death-penalty-ultimate-
penalty-abolition [https://perma.cc/CU6K-XW4H]. 
76. Susan Campbell, What’s Next for Death Penalty Abolition Group?, HARTFORD COURANT (Apr. 
17, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-17/news/hc-campbell-cnadp-0417-
20120417_1_repeal-organization-regroups-death-row [https://perma.cc/9SS9-QLJX]. 
77. See State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811, 811 (Conn. 2016). 
78. Connecticut Voters Split on Death or Life Without Parole, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; 
But Voters Say Abolishing Death Penalty Is Bad Idea, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. (Apr. 25, 2012), 
https://poll.qu.edu/connecticut/release-detail?ReleaseID=1739 [https://perma.cc/4FKT-LRBG]. 
79. LARRY W. KOCH, COLIN WARK & JOHN F. GALLIHER, THE DEATH OF THE DEATH PENALTY: 
STATES STILL LEADING THE WAY 107–09 (2012). 
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(Republican).80 The issue came up repeatedly in the following years, 
including a 1999 bill passed to create a moratorium on executions, and a 
2007 repeal bill that came within one vote of passage.81 In 2015, the state 
Senate again passed a repeal bill, and after Governor Pete Rickets 
(Republican) vetoed the bill, the legislature overrode his veto by a vote of 
thirty to nineteen.82 
That law was challenged by a voter referendum, which placed the death 
penalty question on the ballot in 2016.83 More than 60% of Nebraska 
voters cast a vote in favor of keeping the death penalty in place, effectively 
undoing the legislature’s action.84 
By the year 2000, Illinois had exonerated more men from death row 
(thirteen) than it had executed (twelve).85 Responding to what he 
considered to be a crisis of injustice, Governor George Ryan (Republican) 
established a moratorium on executions in 2000.86 Three years later, in the 
waning days of his second term, Ryan commuted the sentences of all 167 
men and women on death row.87 After a state commission offered dozens 
of recommendations for reforming the death penalty in Illinois, the 
legislature ultimately took up the question of repeal. In 2011 the House 
(60-54) and Senate (32-25) passed a death penalty repeal bill that was 
signed into law by Governor Pat Quinn (Democrat).88 While the 
                                                     
80. Irene North, History Shows Nebraska Unlikely to Uphold Death Penalty Repeal, SCOTTSBLUFF 
STAR HERALD (Sep. 18, 2016), https://www.starherald.com/news/local_news/history-shows-
nebraska-unlikely-to-uphold-death-penalty-repeal/article_05e412ce-7d4d-11e6-96f8-
97234d3fe513.html [https://perma.cc/82VZ-FV4U]. 
81. KOCH ET AL., supra note 79, at 110–113. 
82. Mark Berman, Nebraska Lawmakers Abolish the Death Penalty, Narrowly Overriding 
Governor’s Veto, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/05/27/nebraska-lawmakers-officially-abolish-the-death-
penalty/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.084d63036c6d [https://perma.cc/6Z7E-94UM]. 
83. Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nullify Historic 




84. Shelly Kulhanek, History of the Death Penalty in Nebraska, LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 11, 2018), 
https://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/history-of-the-death-penalty-in-
nebraska/article_54fb4bff-7ef4-5641-abec-6f3f8a4b35c8.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). 




87. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/citing-issue-of-fairness-governor-
clears-out-death-row-in-illinois.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2018). 
88. Patrick Thomas, Death Penalty Debate Takes New Turn with Bill, BEVERLY REV. (Jan. 26, 
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legislation was not retroactive to the fifteen men then on death row, 
Governor Quinn commuted their sentences to life in prison without 
parole.89 
Not long before legislators passed the repeal bill, a Southern Illinois 
University poll found 56% of respondents in the state favored an end to 
the death penalty moratorium and continued pursuit of death sentences.90 
B. Study Procedures 
Across the three states, legislators gave 360 floor speeches on the death 
penalty in the years under study, amounting to 284,064 total words. With 
the help of trained student research assistants, we analyzed the entirety of 
every speech to categorize it for the arguments made in favor or against 
the death penalty and to take note of if and how legislators referenced 
United States Supreme Court decisions and the Constitution. 
First, we read the speech to determine its overall direction on the 
issue—either in favor of the death penalty, opposed to the death penalty, 
or neutral. (There were, in fact, a handful of legislators who rose to 
announce to their colleagues that they were not sure what to do about the 
issue.) 
After a pilot effort to review approximately 10% of the available 
speeches, recurring categories of arguments for and against the death 
penalty found in those remarks were identified. Research assistants were 
then given a definition and example of each category and proceeded to 
analyze the universe of available speeches.91 
We categorized speeches in favor of the death penalty for the following 
topics: deterrence (the death penalty prevents or discourages crime), 
retribution (a terrible penalty is required for a terrible crime), victim and 
family (statements focused on the suffering of victims and/or their family), 
removing dangerous person (the need to protect society from this 
dangerous person), religion (an appeal to the Bible or other religious 
precept to support the death penalty), public support (a reference to public 
opinion or other indicator of popular support for the death penalty), 




90. Press Release, Paul Simon Pub. Policy Inst., Illinois Voters Divide on Abortion, Death Penalty, 
Gambling, and Gay Marriage; Favor Open Gay Military Service (Oct. 16, 2010), 
https://paulsimoninstitute.siu.edu/_common/documents/opinion-polling/simon-institute-
poll/2010/2010_third_release.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G5R-8JKN]. 
91. As a test of intercoder reliability, multiple readers analyzed fifty speeches. There were no 
disagreements on the direction of the speeches, and the topic categorization measures all achieved 
recognized standards of reliability (Krippendorff’s alpha >0.67). 
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prosecution tool (the death penalty is needed to help prosecutors do their 
job and/or achieve favorable plea agreements), longstanding 
practice/tradition (focus on long use of the death penalty in the state or 
nation), and Court/Constitution (an argument built on supportive aspects 
of United States Supreme Court decisions or the Constitution). 
We categorized speeches against the death penalty on the following 
topics, some of which represent a direct counterpoint to advocates’ 
positions: not a deterrent (the death penalty does not discourage crime or 
lower murder rates), arbitrary (who is subjected to the sentence is 
arbitrary, unfair, or not based on the severity of the crime), racial disparity 
(the process is based on the race of the defendant or victim, or racism in 
society at large), cost (a focus on the resources necessary to pursue death 
penalty cases), futility of eye for an eye (questions proportionality of the 
sentence relative to the way other crimes are punished), innocence 
(mentions examples of exonerations from death row or the possibility of 
making mistakes), cruelty (mentions the pain of the procedure or of the 
process to the defendant), lack of closure (the victim’s family does not 
benefit from the process), alternative sentences (the value of life without 
parole and other harsh sentences), prosecution power (prosecutors are too 
powerful, have too much discretion, or are prone to misconduct), religion 
(an appeal to the Bible or other religious precept to oppose the death 
penalty), public support (a reference to public opinion or other indicator 
of popular rejection of the death penalty), Court/Constitution (an 
argument built on aspects of United State Supreme Court decisions or the 
Constitution that limit or reject the death penalty), and redemption 
(assertion that convicted individuals can change for the better).92 
Beyond the direction and the arguments made in each speech, we took 
note of the overall word count of the speech, the word count pertaining to 
the courts and Constitution, and basic facts concerning the legislators 
themselves (including their party, race, and education). 
                                                     
92. As an example of the coding process, this is how the central arguments made in a speech by 
Nebraska State Senator Kate Bolz were categorized: (A) “[I] rise in support of this piece of 
legislation” (coded as an anti-death penalty speech as the bill would repeal the death penalty). (B) 
“Over the last decade the murder rate in the nondeath penalty states has remained consistently lower 
than the rate in states with the death penalty” (coded: not a deterrent). (C) “I am a person of faith and 
I don’t speak of that on this floor very often. But as a representative of the people and as someone 
who campaigned as a person of faith, I do feel compelled to say that I feel as though I am representing 
the people of Nebraska when I represent compassion . . . . ” (coded: religion and public support). (D) 
“If we are a people of faith, we can’t only believe in the pieces about giving ourselves up to God, or 
about what it means to obey the Ten Commandments, we also have to give ourselves up to the idea 
that redemption is possible . . . .” (coded: religion and redemption). Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. 
B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 5 (Neb. May 20, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on 
Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015)] (statement of Sen. Bolz). 
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The data we collected and the methodology we employed in collecting 
it serve two significant objectives. First, we provide a fuller picture of 
what happened during these legislative debates—information that is 
important for its own sake. We see value in aggregating and categorizing 
the discussions that occurred in these legislative halls on matters of such 
great significance and in sharing that information with the public. 
Second, we use the contents of these debates to enrich our 
understanding of how state laws—and the legislators who enact them—
relate to community “standards of decency.” These debates provide an 
important window into how legislators perceive their relationship to their 
constituents, which issues matter to legislators, and how legislators 
understand their relationship to the Court and the Constitution. Given the 
Court’s heavy emphasis upon legislative action in determining the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, it is particularly important to 
understand what may animate legislators who are called upon to vote on 
death penalty legislation and how well these motivations align with 
community “standards of decency.”93 
III. LEGISLATORS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 
Having read and analyzed every death penalty speech given by 
legislators in the three states, we now report on the legislators’ positions 
and arguments, as well as the references to United States Supreme Court 
decisions in these proceedings. Consistent with the eventual outcome of 
the votes, across the three states 51.7% of the speeches given were anti-
death penalty, 45.3% favored the death penalty, and 3.1% were neutral. 
Table 1 breaks down the direction of the speeches by party and profession. 
The disparity between the political parties was vast, with over 80% of 
Democratic speeches expressing opposition to the death penalty and more 
than 71% of Republican speeches expressing support. 
There was also a considerable difference between speakers with a law 
degree and those without. Among non-lawyers, just over half (52.4%) of 
the speeches were in support of the death penalty. Among lawyers, two-
thirds (67.3%) of the speeches were in opposition to the death penalty. 
                                                     
93. We recognize, of course, that while we collected data from three politically distinct states, the 
results we found may not be replicated if we were to study the debates leading up to death penalty 
legislation in other states. Ours is a case study, rather than a statistical sampling of the legislative 
history behind every piece of death penalty legislation; our results are descriptive of these debates 
rather than predictive of debates in all other jurisdictions. Moreover, we recognize that there may be 
a disconnect between what legislators say in the floor debates and what truly animates their behavior. 
Legislators may use legislative debates to manipulate the historical record rather than to genuinely 
voice their opinions. Precisely this concern has animated many opponents to the use of legislative 
history in interpreting statutes.  
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Direction of Death Penalty Speeches in 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 
 A. Overall Direction of Speeches 




 B. Direction by Party 
 Democrats Republicans 
Pro 16.6% 71.9% 
Anti 80.7% 24.5% 
Undecided 2.8% 3.6% 
 C. Direction by Profession 
 Lawyers Non-Lawyers 
Pro 29.1% 52.4% 
Anti 67.3% 44.8% 
Undecided 3.6% 2.8% 
 D. Direction by Education 









Pro 56% 67.2% 29.3% 29.1% 
Anti 40% 32.1% 64.6% 67.3% 
Undecided 4% 0.7% 6.1% 3.6% 
 
A similar divide occurs when the results are further broken down by 
education. Among those without a college degree and among those with 
a bachelor’s degree, a majority of the speeches were in favor of the death 
penalty. Among those with a law degree and those with advanced degrees 
in other subjects, a majority of speeches were in opposition to the death 
penalty. 
There is clearly an additive effect between party and education such 
that Democrats with more education were least likely to speak in favor of 
the death penalty and Republicans with less education were most likely to 
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speak in favor of capital punishment. To wit, 90.9% of the speeches from 
Republicans without a college degree were supportive of the death penalty 
while 90.2% of speeches from Democratic lawyers were in opposition to 
the death penalty. 
 
Table 2: 
Length of Death Penalty Speeches in  
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 
Position Word Count (mean) 
All speakers 789.1 
Pro-Death Penalty 912.1 
Anti-Death Penalty  688.7 
Neutral  663.9 
 
The average speech on the subject was 789 words long, which amounts 
to approximately six minutes in length for the typical speaker. As shown 
in Table 2, proponents of the death penalty, who were ultimately on the 
losing end of the vote in all three states, had considerably more to say, 
averaging 912 words in their remarks, while opponents and undecided 
legislators both used an average of less than 700 words. This pattern is 
regularly seen in legislative debates. Those who find themselves 
outnumbered tend to use more time in a last-ditch effort to convince their 
colleagues to change their minds.94 
A. How Legislators Speak about the Courts and the Constitution 
By and large, state legislators do not focus their attention on the 
Constitution or United States Supreme Court rulings when they discuss 
the death penalty. In fact, among legislators speaking in favor and against 
the death penalty, 90% fail to mention any aspect of the Court’s rulings 
or the Constitution in support of their position. As a proportion of their 
entire remarks, the figures are even more pronounced. While the mean 
length of legislators’ remarks on the death penalty is 789 words, their 
speeches contain an average of only twenty-five words focused on the 
Court or the Constitution. That equates to dedicating roughly 3% of their 
words to matters of the Court and Constitution. While proponents of the 
                                                     
94. Also, as a matter of simple math, time for legislative debate is often split equally among 
proponents and opponents. Whichever side is larger, therefore, must necessarily split their time among 
more members, thus producing shorter speeches. See, e.g., Sven-Oliver Proksch & Jonathan B. Slapin, 
Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 3, 520 (2012) (theorizing that in 
some legislative systems, individual legislators will have less time to debate as their party size 
increases). 
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death penalty have more to say than opponents on the Courts and 
Constitution, the difference is slight. 
 
Table 3: 
Mentions of the Courts and the Constitution in Death Penalty 
Speeches in Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 







25 27.2 24 
Court/Constitution 
Mentioned (%) 
8.2 10 7 
 
Legislators often challenge their opponents’ understanding of the law 
surrounding the death penalty. Nebraska State Senator Ernie Chambers 
chastised his colleagues’ lack of knowledge or even interest in seminal 
Court rulings: 
Because you don’t study. You don’t pay attention . . . . [The 
courts] started returning a lot of these cases by saying, “we uphold 
the conviction but we overturn the death sentence.” And then they 
will give examples of where lawyers slept during the trial, where 
they came to court intoxicated. You all won’t read decisions by 
U.S. Supreme Court judges to find out why they make the 
decisions that they do. They have built in overlays of safeguards 
to protect these people who, at the local level, are subjected to 
what would be legalized lynchings.95 
By contrast, Chambers’ fellow senator Beau McCoy portrayed their 
chamber as being replete with constitutional scholars, noting that his 
fellow senators have “a full length and breadth of an understanding and 
knowledge of the Supreme Court cases regarding the death penalty.”96 
Nevertheless, the relatively minimal discussion of the courts and the 
Constitution seems in part a function of the difficulty understanding and 
expressing the foundational legal issues at hand. Some members openly 
                                                     
95. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 128 (Neb. May 27, 2015) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015)] (statement of Sen. 
Chambers) (quotation marks added). 
96. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 33 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015)] (statement of Sen. 
McCoy). 
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admit they do not want to expend the time and energy necessary to better 
understand the pertinent legal questions. Connecticut State Senator Scott 
Frantz prefaced his remarks on the death penalty by saying, “[n]ot being 
a lawyer and, hopefully, not having to learn too much more about the 
judicial system . . . .”97 Others lament their discomfort with the details and 
language of the issue. “Many of you are attorneys. You understand the 
legal aspects,” said Frantz’s colleague State Senator Steve Cassano.98 
Cassano then noted how hard it is simply to read bills on the death penalty 
and other subjects, admitting, “I couldn’t understand most of them 
because they [sic] written in a language I never saw before. ‘Legalese’ I 
call it. I’m a sociologist.”99 
Legislators’ discomfort and unfamiliarity with the legal terrain is 
apparent as they struggle against ubiquitous Latin terms and other phrases. 
Connecticut State Senator John Kissel refers to “the habeuses.”100 
Nebraska State Senator Bill Kintner pauses in a speech to ask for help 
with pronunciation (“Petition for writ of—and I’ll ask the ‘Professor’ over 
here, Senator Schumacher, how to say it—certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of the United States. And I’m sure Senator Schumacher can help with how 
to pronounce that.”101) Nebraska State Senator Beau McCoy employs the 
words “majority” and “plurality” interchangeably: 
In 1976, Gregg v. Georgia, in a landmark Supreme Court 
decision, a plurality, a majority of the Court found that the death 
penalty was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. And I’m going 
to read a quote from the court from the majority opinion on that 
case that has guided this issue ever since across the country. The 
plurality, therefore, concluded that, quote, the infliction of death 
as a punishment for murder is not without justification . . . .102 
Other times legislators’ mentions of constitutional rights devolve into 
little more than an opportunity to inject politically-charged language. In 
the speeches of several legislators rejecting the possibility that death 
                                                     
97. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578, 2009, Reg. Sess. 178 (Conn. May 21, 2009) 
[hereinafter S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009)] (statement of Sen. 
Frantz). 
98. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280, 2012, Reg. Sess. 260 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter 
S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012)] (statement of Sen. Cassano). 
99. Id.  
100. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 130 
(statement of Sen. Kissel). 
101. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 16 (statement 
of Sen. Kintner). 
102. Id. at 33 (statement of Sen. McCoy) (emphasis added). 
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sentences could be imposed arbitrarily or based upon insufficient 
evidence, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process is referred to 




Mentions of Religion Outnumber Court/Constitution in Death 
Penalty Speeches in Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 






13.6 13 14 
Court/Constitution 
Mentioned (%) 
8.2 10 7 
 
Relying on the Constitution and court decisions is likely not the easiest 
way to articulate a position on an issue that is for many legislators a cut 
and dried moral question. Indeed, more frequently cited in legislator 
remarks than the courts and the Constitution are religious beliefs and the 
Bible. Table 4 shows that both pro-death penalty speakers and anti-death 
penalty speakers invoke a religious justification for their position more 
frequently than they cite a United States Supreme Court decision or the 
Constitution. Also, in contrast to the shaky footing legislators seem to 
have when discussing the courts, when they speak of religion legislators 
tend to do so with unrestrained authority. As Nebraska State Senator Bill 
Kintner put it, “We’re doing exactly as God has asked us to do in this. 
And I would submit to you that we’re the only western country that still 
executes people because we’re the only country that still has vestiges left 
of Christianity. Europe has pretty much moved from God.”106 
When legislators do engage with the Court and constitutional questions 
it is typically to extract broad justification for the thrust of their position. 
Which is to say, Furman and Gregg were the most frequently cited cases 
and were referenced in service of making a point on the general 
                                                     
103. Id. at 30. 
104. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 104 (Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) 
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 6, 2011)] (statement of Rep. Durkin). 
105. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 456 
(statement of Sen. Williams). 
106. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 45 (statement 
of Sen. Kintner). 
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acceptability of the death penalty. Indeed, these cases were practically 
depicted as the last word on the subject. Citing Gregg, Nebraska State 
Senator Beau McCoy said the Court had spoken on the death penalty 
“most notably” in this case, labeling it a “landmark Supreme Court 
decision.”107 McCoy did not mention any other Court decision on the 
issue, nor even hint at any evolution in Court thinking evinced in four 
decades of subsequent decisions. In contrast to Furman and Gregg, totally 
unmentioned by legislators are more contemporary cases such as Atkins 
and Roper, which not only place direct constraints on the pursuit of capital 
sentences but also continue to affirm the centrality of state legislative 
action in the Court’s practical application of the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Legislators and Contemporary Standards of Decency 
In fact, rather than accurately depicting the interactive relationship 
between state legislatures and the courts on the death penalty, legislators 
almost unanimously depict their work as wholly dependent on court 
decisions. “We have to be consistent and I think we are consistent. We are 
as consistent as the courts will allow us to be,” Nebraska State Senator 
Jim Scheer said,108 offering a variation on the commonly held sentiment 
that legislators are constrained by the courts in ways that are neither 
welcome nor necessarily logical. 
In stark contrast with the way the Court operationalizes the Eighth 
Amendment, legislators repeatedly suggest that they lack even the 
potential power to influence the Court. Connecticut State Representative 
Mike Lawlor’s comments were typical of legislative sentiment when he 
said that to alter the Court’s disposition toward the death penalty “you’re 
going to have to amend the [C]onstitution or change the makeup of the 
United States Supreme Court.”109 
The Court’s dramatic turn on the question of whether intellectually 
disabled defendants can be subject to the death penalty, however, is just 
one contemporary example of a Court transformation based neither on 
amendment nor personnel change, but rather because of state legislative 
behavior. In 1989, Justice O’Connor wrote the plurality opinion in Penry 
in which the Court found subjecting the intellectually disabled to the death 
                                                     
107. Id. at 33 (statement of Sen. McCoy). 
108. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 31 (Neb. May 15, 2015) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 15, 2015)] (statement of Sen. 
Scheer). 
109. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578, 2009, Reg. Sess. 131 (Conn. May 13, 2009) 
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009)] (statement of Rep. 
Lawlor). 
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penalty was not in conflict with the Eighth Amendment.110 Justice 
O’Connor was then part of a Court majority overturning the Penry 
decision “in light of the dramatic shift in the state legislative landscape 
that has occurred in the past 13 years.”111 When Penry was heard, only 
two states specifically barred the use of the death penalty for intellectually 
disabled defendants. When Atkins was heard, eighteen states had 
exempted intellectually disabled defendants from capital sentences, 
prompting the Court in Atkins to note “the large number of States 
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete 
absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such 
executions) provides powerful evidence that today our society views 
mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average 
criminal.”112 
Even more striking are the legislators who not only fail to acknowledge 
that decisions of state legislatures inform the Court’s view of the Eighth 
Amendment but who directly contradict the premise of the Court’s 
objective indicators of community standards doctrine. Nebraska State 
Senator Paul Schumacher told his colleagues, “Our courts have repeatedly 
said that it is impossible to divine the intent of the electorate. And, 
therefore, this gives us no guidance at all.”113 In actuality, as the plurality 
in Penry noted, the Court values state legislative action as “the clearest 
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values.”114 Which 
is to say, the Court literally does rely on legislatures to divine the intent 
of the electorate. Consistent with most legislative references to the Court, 
Schumacher does not mention any case or otherwise explain the origins 
of an assertion that defies the objective indicators concept in use for more 
than four decades. 
Table 5: 
Mentions of Public Sentiment in Death Penalty Speeches in 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 






24.4 35 15 
                                                     
110. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002). 
111. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 310 (2002). 
112. Id. at 315–16. 
113. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 15, 2015), supra note 108, at 77 
(statement of Sen. Schumacher). 
114. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331. 
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Even as the Court assumes in state legislators the ability to divine, or 
at minimum represent, the opinion of their constituents, in most of their 
speeches legislators do not claim to be speaking on behalf of community 
sentiment (Table 5). Among pro-death penalty speeches, only 35% 
include a mention of public sentiment, while among anti-death penalty 
speeches just 15% do. Thus, most legislator speeches do not claim a public 
mandate, and even among those that do, such speeches collectively assert 
contradictory notions of both the direction and relevance of public 
opinion. 
When legislators do speak of public opinion it is commonly presented 
in a way that is anecdotal (Connecticut State Senator Rob Kane mentioned 
he had heard concerns about death penalty repeal efforts while “I was 
pounding the proverbial pavement, if you will, knocking on doors, 
meeting with diners at coffee shops and at the local supermarkets”115) or 
purely impressionistic (Nebraska State Senator Kate Bolz: “I do feel 
compelled to say that I feel as though I am representing the people of 
Nebraska when I represent compassion . . . .”116). It is fair to say that 
legislators are not regularly employing scientific polling data to gauge 
public sentiment back home. 
Other legislators admit they are acting against what they perceive to be 
the public’s beliefs. “Many of our constituents have pointed out . . . that 
if I vote to repeal the death penalty that I could be voting against a majority 
of my own constituents, and I acknowledge that that may be true,” 
Connecticut State Representative Patricia Miller said.117 She added that 
her colleagues will be casting “a courageous vote because they will risk 
alienating their own constituents who feel strongly as they do.”118 Miller’s 
colleague State Representative Tim Legeyt admitted that he planned to 
cast his vote “irrespective of the leanings of my constituents.”119 
Several legislators went to the opposite extreme, calling for complete 
deference to public opinion by holding a binding voter referendum on the 
death penalty. Illinois State Senator Linda Holmes told her colleagues, “I 
                                                     
115. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 245 
(statement of Sen. Kane). 
116. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 5 (statement 
of Sen. Bolz). 
117. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280, 2012, Reg. Sess. 197 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012)] (statement of Rep. 
Miller). 
118. Id. at 197–98. 
119. Id. at 119 (statement of Rep. Legeyt). 
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don’t think we as a Body should be making this decision for the people of 
Illinois. I would like to give the people of Illinois the opportunity to make 
this decision themselves. Let’s have them weigh in on this. This could be 
put to referendum.”120 
Connecticut State Representative Arthur O’Neill took the same 
position, introducing an amendment to the death penalty repeal bill to 
require a public vote on the issue. O’Neill said “people voting in a 
referendum” is “the ultimate law that we have to answer to. That’s the 
organic law of the state.”121 Representative Miller, in the same speech in 
which she acknowledged a willingness to vote against her constituent’s 
beliefs, railed against O’Neill’s proposal: “It’s been suggested to me that 
we should . . . take a controversial issue like this . . . and put that to a 
popular vote. But I can’t help but think that our founding fathers were a 
little more prescient than that and that’s why they designed representation 
so that we would not have a mob rule.”122 
As noted, after opponents gathered the necessary petition signatures to 
place the question on the ballot, the contentious work of the Nebraska 
State Senate that resulted in a death penalty repeal was ultimately subject 
to a statewide referendum and overturned when more than 60% of the vote 
favored reinstating the death penalty. 
In short, despite their Court-ascribed status as a window of 
contemporary values, legislators disagree about what those values are, 
disagree about whether they are any kind of window on them, disagree 
about whether the community’s values are even relevant to the matter at 
hand, and provide no evidence that they would vest in themselves the 
interpretive power the Court ascribes to them. Poll results in Connecticut 
and Illinois and the referendum outcome in Nebraska all favored the death 
penalty as legislators voted to abolish it, suggesting that legislative 
behavior is a rather unreliable interpreter of public sentiment. 
Connecticut State Senator John McKinney likely comes closest to 
articulating the concept that the Court does concern itself with the 
prevalence of death penalty practices across the fifty states. The direction 
of McKinney’s explanation (“[O]ne of the standards used to determine 
whether something is constitutional under the [Eighth] [A]mendment is 
evolving standards of decency. And if we’re doing something that is 
harsher with respect to confinement than any other state is doing, that 
                                                     
120. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 50 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011)] (statement of Sen. Holmes). 
121. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 407 
(statement of Rep. O’Neill). 
122. Id. at 386–87 (statement of Rep. Miller). 
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might be stricken down as well.”123) nonetheless implies that the Court is 
the constraint on state legislative behavior rather than acknowledging that 
the decisions of the other forty-nine states would effectively set the 
standard here. In other words, the implication of McKinney’s comments 
is that the state must follow the Court, without acknowledgment that the 
Court is following the behavior of the states. 
C. Uncertain Guidance from the Court 
Beyond misunderstanding the legislature’s role in influencing the 
Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, legislators commonly 
misconstrue United States Supreme Court guidance along other 
dimensions. While multiple Court decisions permit the use of capital 
punishment in only narrowly defined circumstances, and only upon 
individualized consideration of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances,124 Connecticut State Representative Gary Holder-Winfield 
suggests something close to the opposite when he asserts that states must 
frequently impose the death penalty if they are to use it at all: “[W]hen we 
want to talk about doing this rarely, we’re on troubled ground[;]” Holder-
Winfield said, “Because the Supreme Court said that when the death 
penalty statute applies, it should be used.”125 Meanwhile, Nebraska State 
Senator Colby Coash referred elliptically to a Court case that categorically 
bars the imposition of life without parole sentences: 
There was a Supreme Court case, and I am going to find 
[it] . . . It’s going to take me a little longer to find that, but there 
                                                     
123. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 304 (statement 
of Sen. McKinney). 
124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited to 
those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme 
culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ This principle is implemented throughout 
the capital sentencing process. States must give narrow and precise definition to the aggravating 
factors that can result in a capital sentence. In any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to raise 
as a mitigating factor ‘any aspect of [his or her] character or record and any of the circumstances of 
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’ There are a number 
of crimes that beyond question are severe in absolute terms, yet the death penalty may not be imposed 
for their commission. The death penalty may not be imposed on certain classes of offenders, such as 
juveniles under 16, the insane, and the mentally retarded, no matter how heinous the crime. These 
rules vindicate the underlying principle that the death penalty is reserved for a narrow category of 
crimes and offenders.” (citations omitted)).  
125. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009), supra note 109, at 147 
(statement of Rep. Holder-Winfield). Though it is not clear what decision Holder-Winfield believes 
established this premise, the implication that states must regularly, essentially reflexively, impose 
death sentences conflicts with the Court’s demand that death sentences only be imposed after 
“individualized consideration.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
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was a Supreme Court case that said if you put in life without the 
possibility of parole, you usurp the governor’s and the pardons 
board’s ability to commute a sentence. Therefore, you are 
violating the separation of powers.126 
Senator Coash did not ultimately provide the name of the case he believes 
establishes a ban on life without parole sentences (a practice then in use 
in forty-nine states including Nebraska) nor did Representative Holder-
Winfield explain the origins of his belief that the death penalty must be 
used frequently to be used at all. 
When Nebraska State Senator Mike Groene repurposed the famous 
Potter Stewart quote (“I know it when I see it”127) to explain how the Court 
goes about seeking justice in death penalty cases, he was expressing a 
skepticism about the Court common among legislators. As a whole, they 
cannot identify meaningful foundations under the Court’s rulings on the 
death penalty, and when they do, they frequently misunderstand the core 
point. 
Perhaps the most frequent focus when the Court and the Constitution 
were invoked was speculation about how specific legislation or a 
provision within that legislation would stand up to scrutiny. In 
Connecticut, for example, embedded in the bill that would abolish the 
death penalty for future trials was a provision that would maintain the 
death penalty for the eleven men already on Connecticut death row. 
Legislators took to the floor to assert their views on the Constitution 
and on the Court’s most likely response, or simply to worry that the 
resolution of the question was essentially unknowable. “The State could 
not and would not—could not constitutionally and would not, as a matter 
of public policy—seek to execute someone for a crime they committed 
today when they could not be executed for committing that same crime 
tomorrow,” said Connecticut State Representative Arthur O’Neill.128 
O’Neill added, “I don’t think that would stand up as a matter of 
constitutional law. I don’t think the courts would permit it and I’m sure 
this legislature would not want us to be doing it.”129 Similarly, State 
Senator Len Fasano concluded, “[I]n my view it is unconstitutional. You 
                                                     
126. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 55 (statement 
of Sen. Coash). 
127. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 41 (statement 
of Sen. Groene). 
128. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 13, 2009), supra note 109, at 240 
(statement of Rep. O’Neill). 
129. Id. 
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cannot treat similarly situated people differently under the context of the 
law.”130 
By contrast, Connecticut State Representative Lawrence Cafero 
lamented what he considered the false confidence of those who believed 
the state could both end (future) death sentences and maintain (existing) 
death sentences. “The bill that we have before us has yet to be determined 
whether or not it’s constitutional,” he said. “But you see here is the rub. 
Many people are making their decision on whether or not to vote for this 
because they are trusting that even if . . . it passes, those 11 animals on 
death row will die.”131 
While legislators could reasonably disagree about how an oft-divided 
Court might respond to the particulars of their bill, some of their 
colleagues made it clear that considerations of the Constitution were 
secondary. “I agree that this bill is imperfect,” Connecticut State 
Representative Terry Backer said, “I might question some of its 
constitutionality. We have processes to challenge constitutionality, so I 
will be supporting here today the bill.”132 That is, Representative Backer 
expresses a willingness to support something he believes is 
unconstitutional because someone else could fight it another day, in 
another venue. This willingness to defy one’s own understanding of the 
Constitution—to defy the oath Connecticut legislators take to “support the 
Constitution of the United States”133—seems to invite skepticism and 
scrutiny rather than deference to legislative intent when the Court 
encounters the work product of these lawmakers. 
D. The Moral Dimension of the Death Penalty 
More than any aspect of Constitutional law, legislators tend to focus 
their remarks on the moral dimensions of the death penalty in their 
remarks on the subject. Tables 6 and 7 list, in order of frequency, the 
prevalence of each argument topic employed by pro-death penalty and 
anti-death penalty speakers. 
 
  
                                                     
130. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 292 (statement 
of Sen. Fasano). 
131. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 87 
(statement of Rep. Cafero). 
132. Id. at 93–95 (statement of Rep. Backer). 
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-25 (West 2017), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/pub/chap_004.htm [https://perma.cc/MK9M-DV33]. 
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Table 6: 
Topics of Pro-Death Penalty Speeches in  
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 
 Connecticut* Illinois* Nebraska* Total* 
Retribution 60 42 53 55 
Victim/Family 47 50 25 37 
Public Opinion 31 17 42 35 
Removing 
Dangerous Person 
38 42 28 33 
Deterrent 40 42 15 28 
Prosecution Tool 24 58 8 18 
Longstanding 
Practice/Tradition 
13 100 18 14 
Religion 1 100 27 13 
Court/Constitution 14 8 6 10 
* % using argument (speakers may use more than one). 
Table 7: 
Topics of Anti-Death Penalty Speeches in  
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures 
 Connecticut* Illinois* Nebraska* Total* 
Innocence 42 67 33 40 
Arbitrary 31 38 32 32 
Lack of Closure 36 19 25 28 
Alternative 
Sentences 
36 38 21 28 
Financial Cost of 
Process 
25 33 21 24 
Not a Deterrent 33 33 18 25 
Racial Disparity 24 24 9 16 
Eye for an Eye 
Futility 
22 19 9 15 
Public Opinion 10 5 19 15 
Religious 
Objection 
6 5 21 14 
Prosecution Power 12 19 10 12 
Cruelty 2 24 14 11 




2 0 6 4 
* % using argument (speakers may use more than one). 
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Supporters of the death penalty are more likely to discuss retribution 
than any other aspect of the issue, with 55% of all pro-death penalty 
speeches discussing the topic. They speak of the need for a fitting 
punishment for a terrible crime. They speak of depraved people who 
deserve to die. In their words, death row is populated by “murderous 
savages”134 who are “pure evil.”135 They speak of the need for “old west 
justice”136 and boast of being personally “pro-death.”137 Notable crimes 
and victims are a recurring point of emphasis. The notorious 2007 home 
invasion in Cheshire, Connecticut was a frequent subject of commentary 
in the Connecticut legislature. State Senator Michael McLachlan, for 
example, quoted at length from a surviving member of the family, 
Dr. Petit . . . he made an incredible impression on my feeling 
about this issue . . . . “If you allow murderers to live, you are 
giving them more regard, more value than three women who 
never hurt a soul and played by all of society’s rules for all of their 
short lives. My family got the death penalty and you want to give 
murderers life. That is not justice. Any penalty less than death for 
murder is unjust and trivializes the victim and the victim’s family. 
It is immoral and unjust to all of us in our society.”138 
The moral dimension that animated death penalty opponents, and the 
topic discussed more frequently than any other in their speeches, was the 
prospect of punishing the innocent. Forty percent of all speeches against 
the death penalty include a discussion of those exonerated from death row 
or the danger of carrying out a death sentence against an innocent person. 
Though it is certainly also a legal issue, these legislators focus on what 
they see as the indefensible moral aspect. For example, after quoting an 
expert who testified that innocent people have been executed, Connecticut 
State Senator Gayle Slossberg said, “Is that the society we want where we 
execute innocent people? And if our society executes an innocent person, 
there’s no possibility of fixing that error. There is no turning back. 
Haven’t we then become the evil we are trying to eliminate?”139 
                                                     
134. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 12 (statement 
of Sen. Schnoor). 
135. Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Riepe). 
136. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015), supra note 95, at 104 
(statement of Sen. Bloomfield). 
137. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 28 (statement 
of Sen. Riepe). 
138. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 366 
(statement of Sen. McLachlan). 
139. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 280 (statement 
of Sen. Slossberg). 
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These dueling portrayals of evil underscore the difficulty proponents 
and opponents have in reaching each other. To each side, the perpetration 
of evil is indefensible and must be opposed with unrestrained vigor. But 
these legislators look for and see evil in different places. 
It is perhaps not surprising given the opposing moral visions on display 
here that debate on the death penalty is often deeply and openly personal. 
Nebraska State Senator Lydia Brasch challenged her colleague Ernie 
Chambers, the prime sponsor of the bill, to repeal the death penalty: “We 
have heard Senator Chambers tell us several times . . . that he does not 
believe in God. So I don’t understand why repeal here is a priority to 
him.”140 There is, at times, a near mocking quality as those on one side 
distinguish themselves from those with whom they disagree. As Nebraska 
State Senator Groene put it, some people “in our lily-white society, who 
live their perfect middle-class lives, say we can’t pull the lever, well, God 
made people who can.”141 
Rather than focus on his colleagues, Nebraska State Senator Colby 
Coash trained his attention on the behavior of some death penalty 
supporters. Coash described his personal journey on the issue that began 
with a road trip during college to witness the atmosphere of an execution: 
I made a trip down to the state penitentiary because I thought that 
would be something to see, to be part of justice, to be part of an 
execution. And when I went down there, there were two sides of 
people that were there to witness. And there was a side there that 
thought it was a party, and they had a barbeque. And they had a 
countdown like it was New Year’s Eve. They had a band. Can 
you imagine that, colleagues? A band at an execution. And on the 
other side of that parking lot were people who were quietly 
praying, trying to be a witness to life . . . . And I was on the wrong 
side of that debate that night, and I never forgot it.142 
Accounts like these underscore that for many legislators this is an issue 
that is intensely felt if not always intensively studied. 
Several disparities between the states were no doubt informed both by 
political culture and the particular circumstances of the death penalty’s 
implementation. In Illinois, with exonerations having outnumbered 
executions, anti-death penalty legislators were more likely to focus on 
innocence than their peers in Connecticut and Nebraska. Meanwhile, 
                                                     
140. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 27, 2015), supra note 95, at 22 (statement 
of Sen. Brasch). 
141. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 41 (statement 
of Sen. Groene). 
142. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 7 (statement 
of Sen. Coash). 
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advocates for the death penalty were united in their efforts to place the 
death penalty in the context of a time-honored and spiritually appropriate 
response to crime. Several distinct patterns in argument types are 
employed when the data are broken down by race and party. Among those 
in opposition to the death penalty, African American legislators (29.2%) 
are almost three times as likely as white legislators (10.7%) to cite racial 
disparities in the process. Among both those advocates and opponents, 
Republicans are vastly more likely to cite religion as a reason to support 
(among proponents, 15.9% of Republicans and 0% of Democrats cited 
religion) or oppose the death penalty (among opponents, 29.8% of 
Republicans and 8.5% of Democrats cited religion). 
In total, the legislative battle on the death penalty takes place some 
distance from that of a dry constitutional debate. It is about God and evil 
and lynchings and “old west justice.” It is about parties held at executions 
and depraved acts of violence and only seldom focused on interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment or applying Court precedents. 
E. When Lawyers Speak on the Death Penalty 
Among the subset of legislators who are also attorneys, the contours of 
the debate are noticeably different. It will surprise few that lawyer-
legislators have even more to say than their colleagues, with an average 
non-lawyer speaking for 662 words while lawyer-legislators use an 
average of 1078. More to the point, lawyers’ discussion of the death 
penalty is much more likely to be presented in ways the Court would 
recognize. 
Compared to non-lawyer legislators who support the death penalty, 
supportive lawyers speak almost twice as often on deterrence, one of the 
main pillars upon which the Court’s embrace of the death penalty rests. 
Lawyers more frequently discuss the value of removing a dangerous 
person from society and the importance of the death penalty as a tool for 
prosecutors. Lawyers are more likely to speak of the Court itself and the 
Constitution and less likely to speak of religion. Each of these differences 
reached statistical significance, meaning they were unlikely to occur due 
to chance alone.143 
  
                                                     
143. Statistical significance was calculated to determine the likelihood that the difference between 
the topics mentioned by lawyers and non-lawyers could be due to chance alone. Highlighted measures 
in Table 8 and 9 reached statistical significance at the 95% level, meaning there is a 95% likelihood 
that the difference observed is based on real differences between the groups and not due to chance 
alone. 
13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
2018] ARBITERS OF DECENCY 1431 
 
Table 8: 
Topics of Pro-Death Penalty Speeches in  
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures by Profession 
 Lawyers Non-Lawyers 
Deterrent 47 24* 
Retribution 50 56 




Religion/Biblical 0 17* 
Public Opinion 19 39* 




Court/Constitution 25 06* 
*difference is statistically significant (T-test, p<.05) 
 
Table 9: 
Topics of Anti-Death Penalty Speeches in  
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska Legislatures by Profession 
 Lawyers Non-Lawyers 
Not a Deterrent 31 21* 
Arbitrary 36 29 
Racial Bias 20 13* 
Financial Cost of Process 27 22 
Eye for an Eye Danger 12 17 
Innocence/Mistakes 45 37 
Cruelty 09 12 






Prosecutors Too Powerful 22 05* 
Religious Objection 08 18* 
Court/Constitution 09 05* 
Capacity for Redemption 
of Inmate 
07 02* 
Public Opinion 18 13 
*difference is statistically significant (T-test, p<.05) 
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Lawyer-legislators who oppose the death penalty are also more likely 
to focus their attention on the legal underpinnings of the death penalty. 
Compared to their non-lawyer colleagues, they are more likely to cast 
doubt on the death penalty as a deterrent and depict the process as rife 
with racial bias. Anti-death penalty lawyers also are far more likely to 
warn that such laws make prosecutors too powerful. These differences 
reach statistical significance. Though not statistically significant, lawyer 
legislators were also more likely to speak of the death penalty as 
arbitrarily imposed and potentially punishing the innocent. Like lawyers 
who support the death penalty, anti-death penalty lawyers are less likely 
to mention religion in speeches. 
Beyond shaping how they express their thoughts on the subject, some 
lawyer-legislators point to law school as an experience that shaped what 
they think on the subject. As Connecticut State Senator Edward Meyer 
explained, his law school studies left him in doubt of any death penalty 
deterrence effect and repulsed by the idea that the death penalty was 
merely a tool for vengeance: 
I went to law school and motivated by a criminal law professor, 
studied for the first time the issue of capital punishment as we 
called it. And I probably was pro capital punishment but I decided 
to do my third year thesis on capital punishment. And somewhat 
to my surprise, I discovered . . . that the death penalty does not 
have a deterrent effect. And if it doesn’t have a deterrent effect, 
what are we doing with it except—except in effect being 
vindictive?144 
After considering more than 280,000 words of legislative speeches on 
the death penalty, several significant patterns emerge. Despite being 
viewed by the Court as an objective indicator of community standards of 
decency, legislators themselves dispute just what the community thinks 
and how relevant that should be to their work. Their understanding of 
Court precedents is generally limited or even fallacious. Instead, they 
express their beliefs on the death penalty in frequently personal and moral 
language. To be sure, positions and points of emphasis on this issue vary 
by party, profession, and race, but little in the sum of legislative debate 
suggests legislators are equipped or inclined to fill the role the Court has 
given them on this issue. 
  
                                                     
144. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 254 
(statement of Sen. Meyer). 
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IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, we highlight three major implications for the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment doctrine from the findings discussed above. First, we 
explain how our findings cast doubt on the accuracy of legislative 
outcomes as indicators of “evolving standards of decency,” and we 
caution against over-reliance on legislative outcomes in the Eighth 
Amendment analysis. Second, we explore the implications of legislators’ 
ignorance of their institutional role in the development of constitutional 
law. Finally, we discuss the possibility that legislative debates themselves 
may provide insights into society’s “evolving standards.” In particular, we 
observe that legislators in these debates frequently cited the risk of 
wrongful execution as a motivation for their opposition to the death 
penalty—evidence that the Court’s equivocal stance on the 
constitutionality of executing the innocent may be out of step with 
“evolving standards of decency.” 
A. The Viability of Legislation as “Objective Indicia” of “Evolving 
Standards of Decency” 
The data we collected and the findings reported above suggest that state 
legislation is an imperfect indicator of “evolving standards of decency.” 
Our study lends support for all the critiques of state legislation mentioned 
in Part I: that legislation is an imperfect gauge of public opinion; that the 
quality of legislative decision-making is often abstract and sometimes ill-
informed; and that it is difficult to decipher a clear signal about a single 
rationale behind death penalty legislation. 
First, the data support the critique that legislation may not accurately 
reflect community sentiment.145 Although we cannot and do not attempt 
to generalize from our case study to all state legislation, the debates we 
studied did suggest a possible mismatch between public opinion and 
legislative action. As discussed above, the vast majority of the legislative 
                                                     
145. Notably, our data set consist only of legislative debates in states that were actively considering 
abolishing the death penalty. We did not collect any data about how accurately older legislation either 
abolishing or permitting the death penalty reflects current community consensus. We can hypothesize, 
however, that older legislation is further disconnected to contemporary community opinion. See, e.g., 
David Niven et al., A “Feeble Effort to Fabricate National Consensus”: The Supreme Court’s 
Measurement of Current Social Attitudes Regarding the Death Penalty, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 83, 102–
03 (2006) (describing disconnects between public opinion and state legislation, including that “state 
policies will lag current public opinion, and in some cases, be more reflective of the political culture 
of another era than of today” (footnote omitted)); Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2423 (noting that 
changes in the usage of the death penalty are more likely to keep in step with public opinion than 
legislation, which lags behind with the force of inertia). 
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debate was focused on other considerations besides public opinion about 
the death penalty. Only 35% of death penalty proponents and 15% of 
death penalty opponents mentioned public opinion in some form,146 and 
those who did invoke public sentiment were often anecdotal or 
impressionistic.147 There is little evidence from the floor debates that 
legislators were attempting to voice their constituents’ sentiments on the 
issue, let alone doing so successfully. Of course, we acknowledge that 
legislators who share the same general world view as their constituents 
may share their beliefs on capital punishment as well; even if legislators 
do not explicitly invoke their constituents’ opinions, they may be 
consciously or unconsciously aligned with them. Yet the limited 
discussion of public opinion does suggest that the legislators were not 
acting as the mouthpiece of the community and did not see themselves as 
such, and it lends support to the critique that legislation does not always 
echo contemporary sentiment. 
Nebraska presents a particularly interesting example of the imperfect 
relationship between state legislation and the public’s “standards of 
decency.” After the legislature passed a bill repealing the death penalty, 
Governor Rickets vetoed the bill, and the bill was then passed through a 
legislative override. The citizens of Nebraska then reinstated the death 
penalty through a popular referendum—significant (though not 
conclusive) evidence that the legislative action was inconsistent with 
popular opinion.148 
A question worthy of greater study is whether and to what extent the 
existence of a referendum mechanism changes the legislators’ sense of 
obligation to implement the will of the people. Does it free them to do 
what they believe is right, since they know that the people have the power 
overturn their action directly if they disagree? Does it—like the threat of 
reversal by an appellate court—channel their discretion to comport with 
public opinion? Or does it encourage them to retreat from the question 
altogether? For example, Illinois State Senator Linda Holmes asserted, “I 
don’t think we as a body should be making this decision for the people of 
                                                     
146. See supra section III.B tbl.5. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 115–116; S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on H.B. 6578 (Conn. 
May 21, 2009), supra note 97, at 245 (statement of Sen. Kane); Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 
268 (Neb. May 20, 2015), supra note 92, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bolz). 
148. Just as legislation may not truly reflect community sentiment, popular referenda may not 
either. Problems of ballot access, disenfranchisement, low voter turnout infect the representative bona 
fides of popular referenda in addition to elections, as discussed earlier. And the problems of abstract 
and non-individualized thinking about matters of great moral complexity may well be more serious 
in the context of a ballot initiative, where a voter may check “yes” or “no” without having given the 
matter any serious thought at all, than in the context of a legislative debate. 
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Illinois.”149 We did not observe any clear indication that the possibility of 
a referendum shaped the relationship between the legislative outcome and 
public opinion. Nebraska and Illinois have referendum mechanisms while 
Connecticut does not. Public opinion was mentioned most often in 
Nebraska and least often in Illinois, with Connecticut in between. 
 
Table 10: 
Public Opinion Mentions by State 
Among Pro-DP Legislators Among Anti-DP Legislators 
CT 31% CT 10% 
IL 17% IL 5% 
NE 42% NE 19% 
 
Second, the data provide support for the critique that legislative 
decision-making is more abstract and absolutist than the individualized 
consideration one might find in actual cases. Much of the language used 
to describe capital defendants in the debates was general, colorful, and 
dehumanizing; those convicted of capital crimes were termed “murderous 
savages,”150 “pure evil,”151 and so forth. To be sure, such language is 
frequently used by prosecutors in individual cases, as well.152 Yet there 
was virtually no nuance in the debates about the lives and individual 
characteristics of the capital defendants—from either the pro-death 
penalty legislators or, just as notably, from the anti-death penalty 
legislators. While legislators considered the possibility that innocent 
people could be convicted and sentenced to death, guilty defendants were 
not discussed in any kind of humanizing or individuating way. Moreover, 
the legislators demonstrated little specific knowledge about the legal 
system or how capital trials work, making it doubtful that they fully 
understood or had thought about the human consequences in individual 
cases. 
The primary mechanism by which the legislative debates narrowed 
from the abstract to the individualized was in reference to specific 
                                                     
149. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 3539 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2011), supra note 120, at 52 (statement 
of Sen. Holmes). 
150. Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 12 (statement 
of Sen. Schnoor). 
151. Id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Riepe). 
152. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, Speaking of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 19 (1993) (analyzing the language of violence in the capital trial of an African-
American man tried for the murder of a young white woman). 
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infamous crimes—most prominently, the horrific 2007 home invasion and 
triple murder of the Petit family in Cheshire, Connecticut. The crime was 
described in gruesome detail by several legislators153 who said it was so 
heinous that jurors “vomited” from the evidence.154 One senator 
mentioned the Petit family twelve times in his speech and said his entire 
vote was based on them (“[O]ut of my real respect for the Petit family, 
and Dr. Petit in particular[—]in my opinion, that man is a hero[—]I can’t 
support this legislation.”).155 Others echoed that sentiment,156 calling Dr. 
William Petit “the one we most owe.”157 
These discussions amplified the brutality of murder and the savagery 
of those who commit it. They in no way amplified or individualized the 
humanity of those who would be put to death.158 
We are not surprised by the abstract and vilifying tenor of the 
legislative debates, even in these debates resulting in the abolition of the 
death penalty. Indeed, that tenor seems entirely expected given the 
generalized role that legislators play and the far more painstaking task of 
seeing humanity in killers than in victims. The abstraction of the debates 
was conceptually significant; however, because it made salient how the 
two primary “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of decency”—
legislation and jury verdicts—involve fundamentally different types of 
moral reasoning. 
In the context of capital sentencing, rather than capital legislation, the 
Court has strongly emphasized the importance of deliberative, 
individualized decision-making—and indeed has structured its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence to facilitate it. Under the Eighth Amendment, 
the factfinder must be given an opportunity for “the particularized 
                                                     
153. For example, one legislator asked his colleagues to put themselves in the place of surviving 
family member Dr. William Petit. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra 
note 98, at 295 (statement of Sen. Fasano) (“[T]hey strangled and raped your wife, they tied your kids 
to the bed, they poured gasoline over them, they did unspeakable things to them . . . .”). 
154. H.R. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 11, 2012), supra note 117, at 45 
(statement of Rep. Cafero). 
155. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 247 (statement 
of Sen. Suzio). 
156. Id. at 295 (statement of Sen. Fasano) (“[B]efore the Cheshire murders I really was in between 
on whether I’d vote against the death penalty or not. I really, really was.”). 
157. Id. 
158. One interesting exception to the overall abstraction was the deeply personal story by Nebraska 
State Senator Colby Coash about a road trip he took during college to witness the atmosphere of an 
execution. See supra text accompanying note 142; Transcript of Floor Deb. on Legis. B. 268 (Neb. 
Apr. 16, 2015), supra note 96, at 7 (statement of Sen. Coash). Although this anecdote does not 
humanize the killer, it does reflect in a personal and individualized way the seriousness of taking a 
life—even the life of a murderer. 
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consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each 
convicted defendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of 
death.” 159 The plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina160 explained: 
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the 
character and record of the individual offender or the 
circumstances of the particular offense excludes from 
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the 
possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from 
the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons convicted 
of a designated offense not as uniquely individual human beings, 
but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be 
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death . . . [I]n 
capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the 
Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and 
record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.161 
Capital jury trials are thus constrained by constitutional requirements that 
are designed to give the defendant an opportunity to present mitigating, 
humanizing information to make a case for life.162 
The capital jury verdicts that result from this evidentiary process serve 
a dual function. Their most direct impact is to decide the fate of an 
individual defendant. But they are also relied upon to decipher a collective 
constitutional narrative; they are data points about “evolving standards of 
decency.” As “objective indicators,” they point to whether society is 
morally willing to impose the death penalty when also confronted with 
evidence of the offender’s humanity. 
This individualized moral reasoning is largely missing in the legislative 
debates we studied. By and large, the legislators in these debates did in 
fact treat capital defendants “as members of a faceless, undifferentiated 
mass.”163 No constitutional requirement of any kind exists that requires 
legislatures to engage in an exercise to humanize capital defendants, and 
the debates we observed did not demonstrate such an exercise in practice. 
This does not mean that legislation says nothing about society’s—or the 
                                                     
159. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
160. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
161. Id. at 304. 
162. The long and sad history of ineffective legal representation for capital defendants means that 
the promise of these protections has frequently been left unrealized in individual cases. See Stephen 
B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst 
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1869 (1994). We certainly would not want to overstate the individuating 
success of all capital trials in practice. 
163. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion). 
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legislators’—standards of decency. Yet the two types of “objective 
indicators” of society’s morality involve fundamentally different types of 
moral thinking—one required to be individualized, and one predictably 
abstract. 
Indeed, perhaps legislation and jury verdicts are not two data points 
that one might look to in deciphering the same “standard of decency”; 
they are indicators of distinct types of decency. One standard of 
decency—the willingness or unwillingness to impose punishment—is 
deliberately constrained by a process that aims to humanize the offender, 
even while demonstrating the full force of his crimes. The other standard 
of decency—the willingness or unwillingness to authorize punishment—
may be arrived at without any requirement at all to view the recipient of 
the punishment as a human being. 
Despite the qualitatively different deliberative processes in legislation 
and jury sentencing, the Court uses both without differentiation to assess 
“evolving standards of decency.” And the Court never explains, precisely, 
what it means by a “standard of decency.” Is a “standard of decency” an 
instinctual, gut-level moral intuition, or is it a value arrived at upon 
considered reflection? Relatedly, is society’s “standard of decency” about 
a particular punishment properly understood as the willingness to endorse 
a penalty on an abstract level or as the willingness to apply a penalty in an 
individual case? Some commentators have maintained that the Eighth 
Amendment inquiry should give more weight to the punishments people 
would be willing to apply in real circumstances, rather than the 
punishments people would be willing to accept in the abstract.164 And 
Justice Marshall would have evaluated the constitutionality of the death 
penalty not according to people’s existing impressions of capital 
punishment, but rather according to his prediction that “the American 
people, fully informed as to the purposes of the death penalty and its 
liabilities, would . . . reject it as morally unacceptable.”165 But the Court, 
if anything, has given more weight to legislative processes as evidence of 
“objective standards of decency,” without inquiring into the type of 
deliberation or moral reasoning that occurs within them.166 
One might argue that the Court’s attention to both legislative action and 
jury decision-making as “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of 
                                                     
164. See Smith et al., supra note 4, at 2421. 
165. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
166. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most 
reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s 
legislatures.’” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by 
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (2002))). 
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decency” is an effort to capture both types of deliberation—that which is 
applied to individual cases and that which is theorized at a more abstract 
level. Perhaps this is so. But if there comes a time when a conflict arises 
between the “standards of decency” suggested by the laws on the books 
and those suggested by the law as enforced through capital jury verdicts, 
perhaps the individualized moral reasoning of jury decision-making 
should take priority.167 To rest our understanding of society’s “evolving 
standards of decency” on a legislative process that is susceptible to 
abstractions and resistant to nuanced individualized portrayals of capital 
defendants diminishes the Eighth Amendment and the protections it 
provides. 
Third, and more briefly, the legislative debates demonstrate a lack of 
consensus even among the legislators who agree with each other about the 
core concerns at play. This does not mean that it is impossible to obtain 
any useful information about the animating principles behind the 
legislation.168 By analyzing the substance of the debates, we can note 
trends about the issues that seemed to be more and less central to the 
legislators. Moreover, as will be described infra, the Court has never 
required any consensus on the rationales behind punishment—only on the 
punishment’s existence vel non. But the diversity of the points of 
discussion does support the critique that deciphering a monolithic 
“consensus” is a challenging enterprise, even within one state’s single 
legislative decision to abandon the death penalty. 
B. Legislators as Constitutional Actors 
The “evolving standards of decency” test has garnered much criticism 
for its reliance on majoritarian legislatures to define the scope of an 
individual right under the Eighth Amendment—for giving too much 
power to legislatures in the constitutional analysis.169 One of the goals of 
our research was to try to discern whether legislators understand their 
                                                     
167. We readily acknowledge that the Court’s current approach to assessing the significance of jury 
verdicts also leaves much to be desired and should be modified to more accurately represent 
community values. The Court tallies capital jury verdicts for death as evidence of society’s standards 
of decency without accounting for the distorting effect of death qualification, which strikes from the 
jury venire all potential jurors who are unwilling to impose death as a matter of moral conviction. See 
Cover, supra note 57.  
168. See infra section IV.C, discussing the significance of the concerns over wrongful execution in 
the legislative debate. 
169. See supra note 5. 
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constitutional role and the power they hold to shape the trajectory of 
Eighth Amendment doctrine.170 
The simple conclusion we reached from the data was no. We found 
virtually no evidence that the state legislators in Connecticut, Nebraska, 
and Illinois understood that their decision-making could impact the 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis of “evolving standards of 
decency.” Instead, the few legislators who came closest to mentioning this 
issue described the Court as constraining the legislators’ independent 
judgment, rather than following it.171 
This ignorance of—or, at least, the absence of discussion by the 
legislators about172—their constitutional role suggests that although the 
“evolving standards of decency” test in some respects involves a dialogue 
between the judiciary and the nation’s legislatures, in another sense the 
two types of institutions are not in direct conversation at all. 
Of course, we acknowledge that the legislators’ apparent ignorance 
about the constitutional role they play does not, on its own, lead to the 
conclusion that state legislation is an inappropriate indicator of evolving 
standards of decency. Indicators need not necessarily be self-aware. 
Jurors, for example, are never told and undoubtedly do not understand the 
constitutional significance of their verdicts in the larger Eighth 
Amendment analysis, but their individual verdicts may still reflect 
something about the community’s willingness to impose the death 
penalty.173 Similarly, other plausible indicators that have been advanced 
                                                     
170. Some jurists and commentators would argue, of course, that this power is merely illusory, as 
the Court will recast legislative action in a way to justify the conclusions it wishes to reach. See Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Corinna Barrett Lain argues that the majoritarian force at 
play in the Eighth Amendment analysis is not the “evolving standards of decency” doctrine itself, but 
rather non-doctrinal majoritarian forces that influence the Supreme Court’s decision-making more 
broadly. Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7. 
171. Connecticut State Senator Jason Welch depicts the Court as all but existing to thwart the will 
of legislators. S. Transcript of Floor Deb. on S.B. 280 (Conn. Apr. 4, 2012), supra note 98, at 133 
(“[T]he first thing the court does is – is they read the statute . . . . I think they’re going to draw one 
conclusion, which I think is the conclusion that we all want them not to draw.”) (statement of Sen. 
Welch). Similarly, colleague John McKinney laments that if the court were to overturn the 
legislature’s work “there’s nothing we could do about that legislatively. That’s what courts do . . . .” 
Id. at 152 (statement of McKinney).  
172. Again, absence of legislative debate is not necessarily equivalent to absence of knowledge. 
But it does suggest that this is not something that legislators are relying on in making their decisions, 
and not something they deem significant enough to mention. The ignorance about other aspects of the 
legal framework seem to support the idea, moreover, that at least many legislators do not understand 
the nuances of constitutional law enough to know their constitutional role. 
173. However, see Cover, supra note 57, for a critique of the use of death-qualified juries’ verdicts 
as an “objective indicator” of “evolving standards of decency.” 
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by commentators and noted by the Court, such as opinion polls,174 
international practices,175 and professional organizations’ standards,176 
would serve as unwitting indicators in a constitutional analysis. To put it 
in more everyday terms, a thermometer does not need to comprehend 
anything at all to be an accurate indicator of the temperature in the room. 
Yet it remains worthwhile to closely consider the legislators’ lack of 
awareness that they play a meaningful role in the Court’s assessment of 
capital punishment’s constitutionality. The legislators’ failure to 
recognize their own constitutional significance lends nuance to some of 
the primary conceptual critiques and defenses of the “evolving standards 
of decency” doctrine itself. 
One of the benefits of a constitutional doctrine that links individual 
rights to objective indicators of society’s contemporary values is 
increased democratic legitimacy. The doctrine ties controversial judicial 
decisions that overturn punishments sanctioned by democratically elected 
legislatures and authorized in individual cases by unanimous juries to the 
will of those very same institutions. However, as we found that state 
legislators showed no awareness that Eighth Amendment doctrine is 
tethered to their own decision-making, the Court’s attempts to couch its 
decisions in the legitimacy of majoritarian sentiment seem rather 
ineffective. The legislators in our study gave no indication that they 
perceived the Court to be acting in accordance with “evolving standards 
of decency” as reflected in the decisions of democratically elected 
legislatures such as themselves. If legislators are unaware of the 
“objectivity” and democratic bona fides of Eighth Amendment doctrine, 
it appears unlikely that ordinary Americans would have a greater 
understanding. The state legislators’ failure to recognize their 
constitutional role suggests the Court may not be achieving the perceived 
legitimacy its doctrine was designed to inspire.177 
                                                     
174. See generally Niven et al., supra note 145, at 110, 113 (noting the superior reliability of 
opinion polls relative to other proxy-based indicators of public sentiment). 
175. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2004); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 
(1977) (plurality opinion). 
176. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014); id. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“Now, however, the Court strikes down a state law based on the evolving standards of professional 
societies, most notably the American Psychiatric Association (APA).”). 
177. The legislators’ failure to see themselves as playing a significant constitutional role begs the 
question of what would happen if legislators embraced their constitutional role more explicitly, 
morphing from constitutional indicators to constitutional actors. Legislators on both sides of the 
political spectrum could engage in expressive legislation with the explicit purpose of influencing 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, even where that legislation would likely have little 
practical impact on the ground in their state because of limited usage of the death penalty. For 
example, lawmakers opposed to the death penalty, even in states that had already abolished the 
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At the same time, the legislators’ failure to embrace their constitutional 
significance may serve to weaken the majoritarian nature of the “evolving 
standards” test in ways that may alleviate some of the critiques that have 
been levied against it. If state legislators perceive themselves to be 
constrained by the Court, even when they are not, an informal, non-
doctrinal counter-majoritarian check may curtail some amount of 
legislative excess in ways that may be normatively desirable.178 
C. The Evasiveness of Innocence in Supreme Court Eighth 
Amendment Doctrine 
In each of the jurisdictions we studied, the legislators banned the death 
penalty. Should their reason for doing so matter in the constitutional 
analysis? 
The Court has never held that the reasoning behind the passage of 
legislation has constitutional significance in the “evolving standards of 
decency” inquiry. But arguably, such a rationale—if decipherable—is 
itself indicative of contemporary “standards of decency,” and legislative 
history is thus an under-investigated source of constitutionally significant 
information. Individual floor statements may be idiosyncratic and only 
tangentially relevant to the “evolving standards of decency” inquiry, and 
concerns of legislators who are far outnumbered and outvoted may do 
little to represent community values. But if we accept the Court’s premise 
that legislation itself is an indicator of “evolving standards of decency,” 
and if substantial numbers of legislators who speak in favor of ultimately 
successful legislation express a consistent rationale for their support, that 
rationale may be quite helpful to our understanding of the value that 
legislation represents.179 Although we recognize that individual floor 
                                                     
practice as a whole, could introduce and seek to pass resolutions reflecting their opposition to certain 
types of practices that might occur within a capital regime. On the other hand, legislators in favor of 
certain capital punishment practices outlawed by the Court— such as the death penalty for child rape, 
prohibited in Kennedy v. Louisiana—could seek to pass expressive resolutions (or actual legislation) 
supporting such practices with an eye toward changing the Court’s perception of “evolving standards 
of decency.” Cf. Richard M. Re, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v. Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1103 (2010) (advancing an interpretation of Kennedy v. Louisiana as having a 
“democratically reversible holding”). 
178. This dynamic pairs in an interesting way with Professor Corinna Barrett Lain’s argument that 
although the “evolving standards of decency” test is majoritarian in nature, and although the outcomes 
of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases are largely consistent with majoritarian sentiment, those 
outcomes are largely traceable not to doctrine but to the influence of non-doctrinal majoritarian forces. 
Lain, supra note 4, at 5–7. 
179. In the realm of statutory interpretation, legislative history is a common—though sometimes 
controversial—reference point. See supra note 1; see, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco, 
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statements, in isolation, may have little persuasive value,180 policy 
concerns expressed repeatedly throughout the debates may carry more 
weight. 
Of course, there are dangers associated with increased attention to 
legislative history in identifying “evolving standards of decency.” While 
legislative outcomes are defined and quantifiable, the legislative record 
can be elusive and difficult to measure. Legislators may feel free to wax 
poetic on the record in ways that are inconsistent with their actual views, 
while legislative outcomes result from legislators’ actions rather than their 
mere words. Legislative history can be manipulated and as such its use is 
controversial even in the more direct enterprise of interpreting statutory 
text.181 
Still, it is worth comment that the most common moral preoccupation 
we observed among the anti-death penalty legislators was the risk of 
executing the innocent. Forty percent of the death penalty opponents 
spoke with concern about wrongful convictions. Interestingly, this 
“standard of decency” has only a tenuous link to existing Eighth 
Amendment precedent.182 The Court has not focused on, nor articulated a 
way to analyze, the risk of executing the innocent in its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. If we do take legislative history seriously as 
an indicator of society’s “evolving standards of decency,” the frequent 
mention of this concern points in favor of increased attention by the Court 
to innocence in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
It may come as a surprise to many that the Court has never held that a 
convicted yet demonstrably innocent person has a constitutional right to 
be released from jail or spared execution. In Herrera v. Collins,183 the 
majority went only so far as to “assume, for the sake of argument in 
                                                     
310 U.S. 16, 22 n.10 (1940) (“Reference to congressional debates may be made to establish a common 
agreement upon the general purpose of an Act.” (citation omitted)). 
180. NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 929, 942–43 (2017) (opining that “floor 
statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history”). 
181. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative 
State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 269–71 
(2013) (describing the controversy over, and decline in reliance on, legislative history since the mid-
1980s). 
182. By contrast, the primary moral preoccupation we observed in the pro-death penalty 
legislators—retribution—is well-recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a legitimate 
penological basis for imposing capital punishment. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) 
(citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 798 (1982)). When exercising its independent judgment as to whether a punishment violates the 
Eighth Amendment, the Court has focused on whether the punishment meaningfully contributes to 
the deterrent and retributive goals of the death penalty. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20. 
183. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
13 - Niven & Cover.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/10/2018  5:52 PM 
1444 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 93:1397 
 
deciding this case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration 
of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a 
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were 
no state avenue open to process such a claim.”184 The Court went on to 
emphasize that “the threshold showing for such an assumed right would 
necessarily be extraordinarily high.”185 If we piece together the concurring 
and dissenting opinions in Herrera, a majority of the justices did voice 
support for the “fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is 
inconsistent with the Constitution”;186 yet the Court has never explicitly 
so held. Although the Court did later rule that a demonstration of actual 
innocence can be a so-called “gateway” into habeas review for a petitioner 
with a procedurally-defaulted constitutional claim,187 the freestanding 
constitutional significance of an individual post-conviction petitioner’s 
factual innocence remains uncertain.188 
In light of the Court’s hesitancy to constitutionalize protections for 
actually innocent habeas petitioners, it should perhaps be less surprising 
that the risk of executing the innocent has played only a minor role in the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis to date. The Court has long held that, 
because death is different in quality and finality than other punishments, 
                                                     
184. Id. at 417. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Kennedy, J.) (“[T]he execution of a legally 
and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.”); id. at 429 (White, J., 
concurring) (“In voting to affirm, I assume that a persuasive showing of “actual innocence” made 
after trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of 
newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case.”); 
id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J., and Souter, J.) (“Nothing could be more 
contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to execute a 
person who is actually innocent.” (citations omitted)). 
To the contrary, Justices Scalia and Thomas would have explicitly held that there was no 
freestanding constitutional innocence claim cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 427–28 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that 
were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly 
discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction . . . . In saying that such a right 
exists, the dissenters apply nothing but their personal opinions to invalidate the rules of more than 
two-thirds of the States, and a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure for which this Court itself is 
responsible. If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 
‘shock[s]’ the dissenters’ consciences, perhaps they should doubt the calibration of their consciences, 
or, better still, the usefulness of ‘conscience shocking’ as a legal test.”). 
187. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 326–27 (1995). 
188. See also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006) (declining once again to resolve what a 
“hypothetical freestanding innocence claim would require” because, whatever the burden, “this 
petitioner has not satisfied it”). 
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there exists a need for increased “reliability.”189 In most instances, that 
“reliability” has been discussed in the context of the decision to impose 
death rather than life—in other words, with respect to punishment rather 
than guilt. This orientation toward punishment has some exceptions. In 
Beck v. Alabama,190 in deciding that a capital jury must be given the 
opportunity to return a verdict of guilt for a lesser included offence, the 
Court explained that the rationale behind invalidating “procedural rules 
that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination” in 
capital cases “must apply to rules that diminish the reliability of the guilt 
determination.”191 In Atkins, when analyzing the constitutionality of 
executing individuals with intellectual disability, the Court did note the 
concern that “[m]entally retarded defendants in the aggregate face a 
special risk of wrongful execution.”192 And in two dissents in recent years, 
Justices Souter and Breyer have discussed at some length the significance 
of wrongful convictions and wrongful executions to the constitutionality 
of the death penalty as a whole or of certain practices within it. 
In Kansas v. Marsh,193 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, would have struck down as unconstitutional a 
statute making the death penalty mandatory when jurors found the 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances to be equally balanced.194 In 
reaching this conclusion, Justice Souter asserted that compelling new 
evidence of wrongful convictions in capital cases demonstrates a risk of 
erroneous executions and necessarily affects the Eighth Amendment 
analysis: 
Today, a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding 
what, in practical terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees 
should tolerate, for the period starting in 1989 has seen repeated 
exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in numbers never 
imagined before the development of DNA tests. We cannot face 
up to these facts and still hold that the guarantee of morally 
justifiable sentencing is hollow enough to allow maximizing 
death sentences, by requiring them when juries fail to find the 
                                                     
189. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“Death, in its 
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a 
year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”). 
190. 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
191. Id. at 637–38. 
192. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
193. 548 U.S. 163 (2006). 
194. Id. at 203 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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worst degree of culpability: when, by a State’s own standards and 
a State’s own characterization, the case for death is “doubtful.”195 
Justice Thomas, writing for a majority of the Court, criticized Justice 
Souter’s argument, asserting that the possibility of the erroneous 
conviction and execution of innocents did not present a constitutional 
problem: 
Because the criminal justice system does not operate perfectly, 
abolition of the death penalty is the only answer to the moral 
dilemma the dissent poses. This Court, however, does not sit as a 
moral authority. Our precedents do not prohibit the States from 
authorizing the death penalty, even in our imperfect system. And 
those precedents do not empower this Court to chip away at the 
States’ prerogatives to do so on the grounds the dissent invokes 
today.196 
 In 2015, Justice Breyer wrote a landmark dissent in Glossip v. 
Gross,197 in which he called upon the Court to revisit the global question 
of the death penalty’s constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment.198 
Among the four primary reasons he cited for his belief that capital 
punishment is unconstitutional was that its “lack of reliability” rendered 
it cruel.199 He cited extensive evidence that the death penalty had been 
wrongly imposed on individuals who were later exonerated and, even 
worse, that innocent individuals had in fact been executed. He suggested 
that “there are too many instances in which courts sentence defendants to 
death without complying with the necessary procedures; and they suggest 
that, in a significant number of cases, the death sentence is imposed on a 
person who did not commit the crime.”200 To Justice Breyer, this evidence, 
which simply did not exist at the time Gregg was decided,201 provides a 
new basis for reconsidering the constitutionality of the death penalty as a 
whole. 
                                                     
195. Id. at 207–08; see also id. at 210–11 (“We are thus in a period of new empirical argument 
about how “death is different”: not only would these false verdicts defy correction after the fatal 
moment, the Illinois experience shows them to be remarkable in number, and they are probably 
disproportionately high in capital cases. While it is far too soon for any generalization about the 
soundness of capital sentencing across the country, the cautionary lesson of recent experience 
addresses the tie-breaking potential of the Kansas statute: the same risks of falsity that infect proof of 
guilt raise questions about sentences, when the circumstances of the crime are aggravating factors and 
bear on predictions of future dangerousness.” (citations omitted)). 
196. Id. at 181. 
197. 572 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
198. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. at 2756. 
200. Id. at 2759. 
201. Id. 
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Legislative decisions to abolish the death penalty in order to eliminate 
the risk of executing the innocent lend support to this line of reasoning. 
The concern over mistakes—over executing the innocent—was the single 
most important issue for death penalty opponents. As the risk of executing 
the innocent begins to take greater prominence in the courts as an Eighth 
Amendment concern, the data we analyzed in our study corroborates that 
it is significant to legislators, and suggests that a capital punishment 
system that bears a significant risk of executing the innocent might 
contravene our “evolving standards of decency.” 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s reliance on legislation as a singularly influential “objective 
indicator” of “evolving standards of decency” cloaks legislative action 
with constitutional significance. The questions of how closely legislation 
tracks community values and how legislators understand their dual roles 
are thus of fundamental importance to the trajectory of Eighth 
Amendment doctrine. 
By aggregating and categorizing the floor statements from the 
legislative debates leading to the abolition of the death penalty in 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Nebraska, we present a picture of how 
legislators reached the weighty decision to abolish the death penalty—a 
picture that is useful for its own sake. The data set obtained also provides 
a baseline from which to critically analyze the Court’s use of legislation 
as “objective indicators” of “evolving standards of decency.” Our analysis 
here led us to three primary observations. First, while we recognize that 
legislation has some value as evidence of contemporary values, the 
legislative history behind the passage of these death penalty laws prompts 
a degree of caution. In our case studies, we found support for the critique 
that legislation may diverge from popular opinion and that legislation 
represents an abstracted form of moral reasoning. Second, we found little 
evidence to suggest that legislators understand that the laws they enact 
impact the constitutionality of the death penalty nationwide—a lack of 
awareness that may have positive and negative effects. And third, we 
noted that the foremost moral concern animating the prevailing 
legislators—concern over executing the innocent—might itself have 
Eighth Amendment significance as an indicator of “evolving standards of 
decency.” 
 
